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NUMBER I

Finding an appropriate vehicle to bring together those high-bracket
taxpayers having risk capital to invest with mineral operators engaged
In mineral development, and in need of such capital, gives rise to a
rather perplexing combination of legal problems. Professor Bloomenthai suggests the mineral exploration fund as one such vehicle. The
primary objective of the article which follows, says the author, is to
provide a common understanding for counsel wherever located with
respect to the mineral, tax, SEC, business association and other problems
involved in the organization, financing and operation of such a fund.

MINERAL EXPLORATION FUNDS t
Harold S. Bloomenthal*

INDEPENDENT

mineral operators have decried for years the
lack of available capital for mineral development. Yet
those with capital to venture often have equal difficulty in
finding responsible mineral operators. Since the available
capital is very likely to be found in locales (generally the
eastern United States) other than those (generally the
western United States) in which mineral operations are
being carried on, problems are presented in bringing together
these two groups with complementary interests. The principal legal problems involved in this process are providing
appropriate legal vehicles and mechanics through which the
varying objectives of the parties can be best realized. One
such vehicle is the exploration fund.
The exploration fund is a means of channeling risk
capital furnished by high-bracket taxpayers into mineral
exploration, particularly for oil and gas. Typically such
funds are sponsored ("promoted") by knowledgeable mineral
operators who utilize the peculiar tax advantages of mineral
t
*
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operations to lure capital. For this reason, exploration funds
are generally designed to permit the taxpayer-investor to
write off a substantial portion of his "investment" as a
deduction against current income. While many funds offer
their securities publicly, undoubtedly there are a number of
private placements of such securities. Although in the past
exploration funds have been concerned primarily, if not
exclusively, with oil and gas exploration and development,
there are no inherent reasons why such funds could not be
utilized as advantageously for other types of mineral exploration. The parties participating in an exploration fund are
likely to be represented by counsel which are widely separated
geographically and of widely diverse backgrounds and experiences. Eastern counsel, for example, is likely to be more
familiar with the legal implications of financing and general
taxation, whereas western counsel is likely to be more familiar
with mineral law and mineral taxation. The primary objective
of this article is to provide a common understanding for
counsel wherever located with respect to the mineral, tax,
SEC, business association, and other problems involved in
the organization, financing, and operation of such funds.
A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT THE EXPLORATION FUND
The prospectuses filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission by seven exploration funds having 1967 programs
have been examined in connection with the preparation of
this article.' The seven funds were chosen at random, but the
sampling is not necessarily representative since there were
at least twenty-three additional exploration funds which filed
registration statements with the Commission pertaining to
1967 exploration programs.' However, the funds examined
do appear to cover a wide variety of arrangements and, while
probably not exhausting the possibilities in this regard, appear
to reflect the more likely alternatives. No examination has
Two of the exploration funds examined were under common control and
offered similar programs except that one limited itself to the exploration
of unproven ("wildcat") properties whereas the other acquired only proven
and semi-proven properties.
2. See Securities Act Registration List, 1967 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. p. 8011.
Since at any one time this list shows only registration statements which
were filed and are not yet effective or those which became effective within
the last three months, the author's count is necessarily incomplete. Successive separate offerings of funds which are otherwise identical have been
counted as a single fund.
1.
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been made of funds which have been financed in reliance on
the exemption for non-public offerings.
While there may be significant variations in the arrangements chosen by a promoter, a sale of a security is generally
contemplated 3 by which the sponsor is to receive from investors
monies or a commitment to make monies available for use in
the acquisition and drilling of oil and gas properties. In
return the sponsor makes available to the fund the necessary
administrative experience and is responsible for the acquisition of the mineral properties, as well as their exploration,
development, and operation. All of the funds examined were
of the "blank check" type; i.e., none of them had specific
properties in the fund or committed to the fund at the date
of the prospectus. In most instances the investors had no
control over the choice of properties acquired for the fund,
although one plan did allow each investor the option of refusing to participate in specific acquisitions, and another fund
granted such a choice to certain categories of participants.
Five of the seven funds intended primarily, if not exclusively,
to acquire unproven ("wildcat") oil and gas properties.
One of the funds planned to acquire only proven and semiproven interests, and the remaining fund intended to acquire
primarily proven properties, although its ability to do so
appears questionable. One of the "wildcat" funds also represented that it intended to secure properties amenable to a
secondary recovery program.' Five of the funds anticipated
exploration exclusively within or off shore of the United
States, with three of them hoping to concentrate their acquisitions primarily in the Texas and mid-continent areas. One
plan foresaw only Canadian and off shore development; and
another fund, while planning to acquire properties primarily
in the United States, reserved the right to spend one-third
of the proceeds on Turkish oil and gas interests.
Of the seven funds examined, five employed underwriters
and paid underwriting commissions. The other two funds
offered their securities directly through the employees of the
3. See text accompanying notes 153-60 infra.
4. Orthodox drilling and producing techniques never withdraw all of the oil
in a reservoir because the natural pressure necessary to force up the oil is
inevitably exhausted before the mineral source is exhausted. A secondary
recovery program involves an attempt to secure further production by
injecting water or gas into the reservoir at strategic points with the hope
that part of the remaining oil will be driven toward existing wells.
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sponsor, one paying commissions to such employees and the
other placing one of its employees on a salary for supervising
the offering.' The underwriting comnissions paid varied
from two to seven percent 6 and, in most cases, a substantial
portion of the underwriting commissions was reallowable to
participating dealers.7 Two underwriting firms were apparently organized for the specific purpose of offering securities
of the particular exploration fund from which the firm's
compensation was paid. In two other instances the underwriters were established securities firms which were either
primarily responsible for or closely associated with the sponsorship of the fund. In only one plan did the underwriter
appear to have no affiliation with the sponsor or the fund.
All the underwritings were on a best-efforts basis, and in all
programs the expenses of the offering were to come out of
the proceeds of the offering. Estimates of such expenses
varied from $18,000 to $50,000.
Generally, the sponsor company, its officers, directors,
or affiliates claimed prior experience with oil and gas exploration, although the extent of such experience varied considerably. Only one of the funds had an experienced staff which
devoted all of its efforts to the management of exploration
funds. The direction of the other six funds was a part-time
endeavor for the particular staffs. However, several of the
Some of the sponsors may arguably be "brokers" as that term is defined by
§ 3(a) (4) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (4) (1964), or
"broker-dealers" within the definition of § 401 (c) of the Uniform Securities
Act. A sponsor's classification as a "broker" under § 3 (a) (4) would depend
upon his being "engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (4) (1964) (emphasis
added). It appears to be difficult to conclude that exploration fund sponsors
could be so classified unless the fund is viewed as some type of "entity."
However, under the Uniform Securities Act broker-dealer classification
would follow if the sponsor were found to be a non-issuer engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for its own account. The
possible classification of the sponsor as an issuer is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 161-68 infra. A few states require a form of brokerdealer registration for an "issue-dealer." E.g., Cow. REVs STAT. ANN. §§
125-1-2, -12 (1963). In any event, registration as an "agent" would be
necessary under §§ 401 (b) and 201 (a) of the Uniform Securities Act for
those active in the sale of fund interests. This registration may involve
among other things furnishing an appropriate bond and passing a mandatory examination. Whether such persons would be "brokers" under the
Exchange Act, and subject to registration thereunder, would depend upon
whether their activities in selling such securities constituted a "business."
See generally H. BLOOMENTEAL, SECURITIES LAW 209-11 (1966).
6. In two of the funds examined by the author the dealers' commissions were
paid by the sponsor and were not taken out of the participants' investments.
7. All of the funds, including those not employing an underwriter, invited
participation by members of the National Association of Securities Dealers,
with appropriate commissions payable to those securing purchasers,

5.
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sponsor companies had organized similar funds in the past
and, in fact, the usual approach for such companies appears
to be to organize separate exploratory funds on an annual
basis.
In all seven funds the sponsor or management company
was compensated primarily, though not always exclusively, by
the grant of an interest in the properties to be acquired by
the fund. Three sponsor companies acquired a so-called
"carried-interest" which permitted the investors to receive
the return of their investment before participation by the
sponsor. The sponsor's compensation in two funds under
common control took the form of a net profit interest defined
in a manner which granted the sponsor-manager immediate
participation with general investors. Another fund's managersponsor was allowed immediate participation during the
payout period, which at the sponsor's election could be converted into a net profit interest after payout to investors.
The sponsor of the seventh fund did not receive an interest
in the property on which exploratory wells were drilled, but
was granted an undivided proprietary right in surrounding
acreage. Thus, this latter sponsor would benefit from its
promotion of the fund only if the contemplated exploration
was successful. While successful development might appear
requisite to the compensation of sponsors who received only
a carried interest, since their participation is subordinate to
that of the general investor, a few of these sponsors took
compensation directly out of the offering proceeds and/or
realized profits in the sale of properties to the fund. Yet,
one is impressed with the fact that in general the managersponsors are utilizing these funds primarily as a means of
obtaining mineral interests at no risks to themselves. In two
of the funds examined a substantial portion of the sponsormanager's own monies would be invested, since these promoters were committed to contribute amounts to the fund on
the same basis as the general public. One suspects that the
reasonableness of the underwriting and management "fee"
arrangements may have been "encouraged" by attitudes
informally expressed by members of the SEC staff.
Of the five funds anticipating exploration of wildcat oil
properties, four proposed that offering proceeds would be
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1969
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used only in the drilling of exploratory wells and would not
be used to complete wells or to drill additional development
wells in the event oil should be discovered. The four plans
contemplated either borrowing funds for these purposes,'
or "assessing" the participants for their proportionate share
of completion or development costs. While in most cases the
participants did not have to contribute io the cost of drilling
development wells, the investor typically had a firm obligation
to bear his proportionate share of the expense of completing
a well that had yielded an oil producing sand. If a participant
fails to meet his obligation, he is generally subject to a penalty
in favor of the person making a contribution on his behalf.
Under some arrangements he forfeits all of his interest in
the acreage other than the unit on which the exploratory
well has been drilled. Usually the person advancing the noncontributor's share of such costs is entitled to recover three
hundred percent of the amount advanced out of the defaulter's
share of production in the event the well should be successful.
The funds examined generally contemplated the immediate distribution to the investors of the proceeds from production. Nevertheless, two of the funds, both under affiliated
sponsorship, required all amounts generated through production or otherwise to be reinvested for a period of ten years.
The majority of the funds examined were established on an
annual basis-monies were raised and expended during a
given year and the participants' obligations terminated after
the initial commitment had been depleted. One of the funds,
however, required annual commitments over an indefinite
number of years. All the funds had minimum commitment
requirements varying from $1,500 in one fund to $25,000 in
another. Presumably, a large minimum commitment should
be effective in screening out small investors.
THE ANALOGY TO MUTUAL FUNDS

The use of the term "fund" suggests that exploration
funds have something in common with mutual funds and
some of the plans examined were not beyond exploiting this
8.

Prior to completion of a well, it is difficult to determine whether an apparent
discovery will in fact produce oil in commercial quantities. Further, there
is a very real possibility that mechanical difficulties will be encountered in
completing and/or producing a well. In light of these two factors, borrowing
production funds on the basis of an apparent discovery may prove to be
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identification. Thus, three of the seven funds used the word
"Fund" in their name and their prospectuses utilized words
such as "Plan,"" Participant,"" Withdrawal Plan,"" Custodian," and "Manager, " all of which are familiar mutual fund
terminology. Only two of the seven expressly stated that
their operations were not investment companies.
In a general sense exploration and mutual funds do have
some things in common. One of the principal similarities is
that both have "managers" who provide the administration
and professional services necessary to select and supervise
the funds' investments-in one case the acquisition of mineral
properties and in the other the selection of a portfolio of
securities. Other similarities include the pooling of funds of
many investors with the enhanced opportunity for diversification. Exploration funds, unlike other means sometimes
employed to attract the same source of capital,' are established
with a view to acquisition and exploration of multiple properties, thereby spreading risk and opportunities. This is particularly important in view of the statistically remote chances
of finding oil.'" One of the funds examined, for example,
represented that it would use its best efforts to obtain and
drill not less than ten drilling blocks annually.
Notwithstanding the similarities, the differences between
exploration funds and mutual funds are more apparent. For

example, an exploration fund is not an investment company
under the Investment Company Act and hence not subject to
difficult. It would be even more difficult to borrow funds for the purpose
of drilling a development well, because a substantial number of such wells
are failures. See note 10 infra.
9. The technique of selling fractional undivided interests in a single undrilled
well has often been used to finance oil and gas exploration through investments by high-bracket taxpayers. A partial exemption from registration for
such offerings not exceeding $100,000 is provided by Regulation B, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.310 (1967), and form S-10 is especially designed for the filing of such
interests. See generally Bloomenthal, SEC Aspects of Oil and Gas Financing, 7 Wyo. L.J. 49 (1953). The Securities Act Registration List, supra note
2, disclosed only one registration statement relating to such an offering.
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, 173 offering sheets were filed
under Regulation B and aggregate sales reported thereunder were
$1,603,144. SEC ANN. REP, 40 (1966-67).
10. During 1966 there were 9,214 exploratory wells drilled in the United States,
of which 1,037 were completed as oil wells, 631 as gas wells, and 7,546 as dry
holes. Thus, the total successful completion rate was 18.1%, or slightly
better than one out of six. The success ratio varied from a low 8.7%, or
slightly better than one out of 12, in California to a high of 44.6% in the
northeastern United States-West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York.
These statistics do not, of course, reflect the quality of the completions.
During the same year 23,769 development wells were drilled, of which 6,011,
or 25.3%, were dry. See 65 OIL & GAS J. 135, 146 (1967).
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the same type of regulation as the mutual fund. Thus, many
opportunities for self-dealing and potential conflicts of
interest exist as to exploration funds which would be proscribed under the Investment Company Act." Moreover,
investments are in mineral properties, not securities, and
involve mineral operations rather than the passive holding
of a portfolio of securities.1" Mutual funds have their primary
appeal to relatively unknowledgeable, small investors ; whereas
investors in an exploration fund are likely to be--and should
be-relatively sophisticated and affluent. Exploration fund
"managers" have nearly unlimited discretion in the selection
of properties while the manager of a mutual fund is subject
to some limitations under the Investment Company Act and
under the fund's policy as to the type of securities to be
acquired. Finally, the exploration fund is typically a much
more speculative investment than a mutual fund, largely tax
motivated, and with substantially different objectives.
MINERAL OPERATIONS-LEGAL ASPECTS

Since this article is intended to be in the nature of a
primer, it may be helpful to discuss the legal framework in
which mineral exploration generally takes place. Mineral
operations of the type being discussed often involve lands
in private ownership as to which there has been a severance
of the surface and mineral rights. The owner of the mineral
rights relating to oil and gas generally is not regularly
engaged in the mineral business and hence is likely to enter
into a lease for the exploration and development of his
property.'8 The oil and gas lease has become a fairly stereotyped agreement. Its specified duration is ordinarily for a
relatively short term-usually 5 to 10 years-with a habendum
clause which provides that the lease shall continue so long
thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities on
the lessor's property. Under the typical arrangement, the
lessor reserves a royalty interest of normally twelve and onehalf percent of gross income from the oil or gas produced.
However, the lessee can usually avoid any obligation to explore
11. See text accompanying notes 149-53 infra.
12. Investments in mineral properties, however, may be "securities" as that term
is used in the Investment Company Act of 1940. See text accompanying
notes 146-49 infra.
13. For a discussion of private oil and gas leasing and the typical oil and gas
lease see generally 3 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW (1967).
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the property during the primary term of the lease by paying
an annual delay rental and, further, can surrender the lease
and all obligations thereunder by failing to make such annual
rental payments. If the property is considered desirable
mineral acreage, the lessee, in order to acquire the lease, will
generally have to pay the owner a cash consideration referred
to as a "bonus" payment. After acquiring an oil or gas lease,
the original lessee will very often assign the leasehold, retaining a so-called overriding royalty interest representing a
specific percentage of the gross proceeds free from all costs
of exploration, development, and operation. Since the leaseholder typically bears all such costs, his interest is often
referred to as the working interest, reflecting the fact that
the holder thereof has the exclusive right to explore and
develop the leased property.
In the eleven westernmost states of the United States and
in Alaska, much of the lands available for oil and gas exploration are part of the public domain and, thus, the right to
explore, develop, and operate such properties can be obtained
only pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920." With
respect to lands located on the outer continental shelf or
within the geologic structure of a known producing oil and
gas field, leases can be obtained only through competitive
bidding. Leases on other available federal land, however, are
issued to the first qualified applicant on a non-competitive
basis. Non-competitive federal oil and gas grants are for a
primary term of ten years with the typical habendum and
delay rental clauses found in private leases. To acquire such
an interest, the applicant must pay in advance a filing fee
of ten dollars and the first-year rental of fifty cents per acre.
Like private leasehold agreements, federal land leases can
be allowed to lapse in subsequent years by failure to pay the
annual rental. Since most desirable federal lands have already
been leased, the non-competitive leases currently available are
either those which a lessee has permitted to terminate by nonpayment of rent or those which have expired at the end of
the lease term because of a failure to obtain production. With
respect to these lands, the Bureau of Land Management has
14. 30 U.S.C. § 223 (1964).

For a discussion of federal oil and gas leasing see

generally ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, LAW OF FEDERAL
OIL AND GAS LEASES (1968). See also F. TRELEASE, H. BLOOMENTHAL & J.
GERAUD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NATURAL RESOURCES 614-723 (1965).
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established simultaneous filing procedures which generally
allow a five-day period in which all applicants may submit
their lease offers. Since typically several applicants will have
submitted the necessary offer within the requisite period, a
drawing is held to determine the "winner" of the particular
lease. Federal leases provide for royalties payable to the
federal government in the amount of twelve and one-half
percent with respect to non-competitive leases and a scaled
royalty in the case of competitive grants.
The oil and gas industry also employs a variety of farmout arrangements pursuant to which the owner of mineral
rights assigns an interest therein in return for the drilling of
a well. These arrangements are often motivated by a desire
to share, and thus reduce, risks and/or the need for financial
assistance. Although major oil companies farm out acreage
to other major companies and to independents, the extent the
grantors are willing to do so and the quality of the acreage
assigned is dependent up their own exploration budget.
Farm-out arrangements take many forms, such as an undivided interest in the acreage to be drilled, a divided checkerboarded interest, or a retained overriding royalty. Risk distribution may also vary. The assignee, for example, may be
obligated for all the drilling and completion costs; or for only
the drilling costs and his proportionate part of the completion
costs. Moreover, he may have the right to recover his costs
out of production.
Mineral rights relating to resources other than oil and
gas vary somewhat from the procedures outlined above, since
in the western states only a small portion of the desirable
lands are in private ownership. To the extent that such lands
are privately held, the leasing arrangements for carrying on
general mineral operations will be similar in general outline
to those employed with respect to oil and gas, although such
leases are not nearly as stereotyped. Entirely different procedures are involved in acquiring metalliferous mineral rights
with respect to government lands, 5 since the mineral location
laws rather than the Mineral Leasing Act are applicable. In
general it is necessary to locate unpatented mining claims
15. On mining locations see generally 1 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FouNDATION, AMERICAN LAW OF MINING 711-906 (1967); and F. TRELEASE, H.
BLOOMENTHAL & J. GERAUD, eupra note 14, at 415-613.
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covering lands in the public domain, a task which in practice
is most likely undertaken by persons regularly engaged in the
business of carrying on mineral operations. Nevertheless, it
is not uncommon for the original locator to enter into some
type of lease or other arrangement with a more adequately
capitalized mining company. These arrangements differ considerably depending upon the mineral involved and the
particular terms negotiated.
MINERAL OPERATIONs-TAx ASPECTS
The tax advantages of mineral operations include the
statutory depletion deduction which is twenty-seven and onehalf percent of gross income in the case of oil and gas, twentythree percent in the case of uranium,"6 and ranges from twentythree to five percent with respect to other mineral property,"
but cannot exceed fifty percent of net taxable income (without regard for depletion) from such property.'" In the case
of minerals other than oil and gas, gross income from the
property is the income from "mining," which in many
instances is defined to permit a computation based on added
values to gross income reflecting such considerations as transportation and milling costs." Accordingly, while the statutory
depletion rate is itself lower with respect to minerals other
than oil and gas, the effective depletion rate may be higher,2"
since the value of petroleum resources for gross income purposes must be computed at the well head."
The statutory depletion deduction, which can be taken
without regard to actual depletion and does not depend upon
the amount invested in the property, often exceeds the depletion deduction based upon the actual cost investment in the
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 613(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(a)
17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 613(b).

(1960).

18. Id.

19. Id. § 613 (c). See generally Bloomenthal, A Guide to Federal Mineral Income
Taxation (pt. 1), 1 LAND & WATER L. REv. 77, 104-06 (1966).

20. The statutory depletion rate for uranium, for example, is 23%. Assuming
a crude ore price of $4.00 a pound, the depletion deduction would be $0.92
per pound. Yet, the integrated producer selling concentrate at $8.00 per
pound can compute statutory depletion on gross income, which in this
instance would be $1.94 per pound or approximately 48.5% of the value of
the crude ore. However, the provision limiting depletion to 50% of net
income will usually come into play and reduce somewhat the amount of
statutory depletion that can actually be taken under these circumstances.
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.613-3 (1960).
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mineral property.22 Depletable capitalized expenditures,
therefore, seldom result in tax benefits.
Since the statutory depletion deduction is in effect a
subsidy to the successful mineral operator whose efforts and
risk-taking have resulted in production, it is undoubtedly
a factor in channeling risk capital into mineral operations.
However, it is probably not as important as the deductions
for exploration and development costs in this regard. These
latter deductions can be offset against current income from
other sources and, therefore, are factors which make an
exploration fund an extremely attractive investment. While
it is not necessary in most cases to distinguish between oil and
gas and other minerals when dealing with the depletion deduction, except as to the percentage rate and basis for determining gross income, the tax consequences differ significantly
with respect to exploration and development expenditures
for the various minerals. In the case of oil and gas, geological
and geophysical exploration costs constitute capital expenditures and not ordinary and necessary business expenses.2"
Hence, expenses incurred in geologizing an area, such as those
resulting from seismic surveys, must be capitalized and
recovered through the depletion deduction regardless of
whether they were incurred for the purpose of determining
whether to acquire a property initially or to retain a property
previously acquired. Geological expenses "necessary in preparation for the drilling" and in the actual drilling are,
however, within the optional deduction for intangible drilling
and development costs discussed below. The line between
geological surveys relating generally to a property and those
relating to the location of a particular drill site is affected
by a number of considerations. The IRS apparently employs
the following criteria:24 (1) To relate to the location of a
particular drill site, and hence to be within the option, the
property must be one already acquired by the taxpayer. (2)
The principal items falling into the category of capital costs recoverable
through depletion are acquisition costs, see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1012;
Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a) (1960), intangible drilling and development costs
in the case of oil and gas, and exploration costs in the case of other minerals,
if capitalized, see INT. REV CODE OF 1954, § 263 (c); Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(b)
(1960).
23. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 7 T.C. 507 (1946), afj'd on other
grounds, 161 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1947); I.T. 4006, 1950-1 Cum. BuLL. 48.
24. Hall, Geological and Geophysical Costs, 16 OIL & GAS INST. 581, 592-93
(1965).

22.
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Drill site surveys generally involve a relatively small expenditure and anything in excess of $3,000 to $4,000 is likely to be
challenged. (3) Drill site surveys are usually followed shortly
thereafter by actual drilling. (4) If the information gathered
tends to outline a complete development, the geological work
probably will not be recognized as having been undertaken to
locate a drill site. (5) Drill site surveys are usually geological
rather than geophysical.
Section 1.612-4(a) of the regulations of the Internal
Revenue Service permit a taxpayer to elect to either capitalize
intangible drilling and development costs or write them off
as a current expense. Although from the standpoint of the
geologist the drilling of an oil or gas well may involve either
exploration or development, depending upon the extent to
which the presence of an oil reservoir has been previously
established, from a tax standpoint no such differentiation is
made between the two activities. Rather, the optional deduction for intangible drilling and development costs in the case
of oil and gas is predicated merely on the drilling of a well.
In the event the election is made to capitalize such expenditures, they must be recovered through the depletion allowance,
except that installation costs of physical (tangible) equipment must be amortized through the deduction for depreciation. Furthermore, the election for each taxpayer is binding
as to all future intangibles." Thus, generally the election
should be to deduct such expenditures." No election with
respect to tangible expenditures is provided and, pursuant
to section 1.612-4(c) of the regulations, all such expenditures
must be capitalized and recovered through depreciation.
In general, intangible drilling and development costs
are expenditures which yield no salvage value and are
incurred in the drilling and preparation of wells for the
production of oil or gas. Examples of items subject to the
option are:
all amounts paid for labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, and
supplies, or any of them, which are used-(1) In
the drilling, shooting, and cleaning of wells, (2) In
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(e) (1965). The taxpayer who has capitalized intangibles on producing wells has a further identical election with regard to dry
holes. See id. § 1.612-4(b) (4).
26. See Bloomenthal, A Guide to Federal Mineral Income Taxation (pt. 1),
1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 77, 118-19 (1966).
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such clearing of ground, draining, road making,
surveying, and geological works as are necessary ii
in preparation for the drilling of wells, and (3) In
the construction of such derricks, tanks, pipelines,
and other physical structures as are necessary for
the drilling of wells and the preparation of wells for
the production of oil or gas.27
Expenditures incurred in the installation as well as construction of derricks, tanks, pipelines, and other physical structures necessary for the preparation of the well for production
are within the option, 8 but the cost of the physical installations themselves must be capitalized and recovered through
depreciation." Accordingly, the cost of items having salvage
value such as drilling tools, pipe, casing, tubing, tanks,
engines, boilers, and pumps must be depreciated. It should
be noted, however, that the Internal Revenue Service has
taken a narrow view"0 of what isinvolved in preparing a well
for production and regards a well as completed for production
when the casing, including the "Christmas tree," 1 has been
installed.
The importance of the intangible deduction in providing
capital to any oil and gas operator cannot be overemphasized.
If, for example, the operator drills a well on a producing
property and the intangible drilling costs incurred total
$60,000, he can, if he has elected to deduct such costs currently,
deduct this amount from the income received from this property or any other source. Assuming, for example, that the
operator's taxable income before deducting intangibles is
$300,000, by taking the intangible deduction he, in effect,
receives $60,000 of this amount free of taxes. The net cost
of the investment for a taxpayer in the highest bracket to the
extent represented by intangibles (and assuming that he does
not have other available deductions) is $18,000 [$60,000 less
tax of $42,000 (70% X $60,000) otherwise payable = $18,000].
In the case of minerals other than oil and gas, the taxpayer has two basic alternatives with respect to exploration
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).
Id.
Id. § 1.612-4(c).
Mem. 6754, 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 30.
The "Christmas tree" is a group of flow control valves which are installed in
a producing well after the casing and tubing but prior to the installation
of the pump.
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expenditures: an unlimited deduction under section 617 of
the Code subject to recapture or a limited deduction under
section 615 not subject to recapture. Under section 617 a
taxpayer may currently deduct all exploration expenditures
"paid or incurred . . . for the purpose of ascertaining the
existence, location, extent or quality of any deposit of ore
or other mineral ... , and paid or incurred before the beginning of a development stage of the mine .... " However, all
exploration deductions taken under section 617 are subject to
recapture and, thus, must be either restored to income in the
year in which the property becomes productive or reclaimed
by a reduction of the statutory depletion deduction relating
to that property. 2 If prior to recapture the taxpayer "subleases" the property,3 3 retaining an overriding royalty and
receiving a cash bonus, the amount of statutory depletion that
ordinarily can be taken with respect to a bonus must be
reduced to the extent of such unrecovered exploration deductions. Further, statutory depletion cannot be taken on royalty
payments until the balance, if any, of the exploration deduction has been recaptured. If the taxpayer makes a complete
disposition of the property through sale, his gain on the sale
will be ordinary income rather than capital gain to the extent
that prior exploration deductions relating to the property
have not been recovered.3 5
With regard to expenditures incurred in the exploration
of minerals other than oil and gas, the other basic alternative
is to rely on the provisions of section 615 of the Code, which
32. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 617(b) (1).
33. Id. § 617(c). Mineral tax lore makes some rather unique and fine distinctions between a sale transaction on the one hand and a lease or sublease on
the other. If, for example, an owner assigns the lease to a producing lessee
for a consideration of $100,000 and retains an oil payment, the transaction
is a sale. However, if the retained interest is an overriding royalty, the
transaction would be a sublease. See generally Bloomenthal, A Guide to
Federal Mineral Income Taxation (pt. 2), 1 LAND & WATER L. REa. 379, 38191 (1966). For varying tax implications in this context see note 35 infra.
34. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 617(c).
35. Id. The different methods for recapture could affect the form of a
particular transaction. Assume there exists an uranium property with no
basis but as to which $100,000 remains to be recaptured at the time of
disposition. This property is to be "sold" for a consideration of $100,000 and
a retained interest. If the retained interest is an oil payment-thus resulting
in a sale-a total recapture can be made on the transaction. If, on the other
hand, the retained interest is an override and the transaction is deemed a
sublease, only 28% of $100,000, or $23,000, will be recaptured and $77,000
will remain to be recaptured from depletion attributable to royalty payments. See Bloomenthal, A Guide to Federal Mineral Income Taxation (pt.
1), 1 LAND & WATER L. REv. 77, 186-91 (1966). Incomplete dispositions
which are "sales" for tax purposes yield other interesting ramifications for
recapture, but they are beyond the scope of this article.
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in various forms has been in effect since 1951. However, the
elections under sections 615 and 617 are mutually exclusive;
and, accordingly, a taxpayer cannot proceed under one as to
some properties and under its companion as to other properties." Under section 615 the taxpayer has the following
elections :87 (1) He may deduct as an expense in his tax year
up to $100,000 of such expenditures, provided, however, that
all amounts previously or currently being deducted or
deferred with respect to the particular mineral property or
any other property do not exceed $400,000. (2) He may elect
to defer such expenditures in any tax year to the extent of
the difference between the amount, if any, deducted during
such year and $100,000, subject to the same $400,000 overall
limitation referred to in (1). In the event the taxpayer defers
exploration expenditures, he may then write them off proratably against the ore body as it is produced. (3) The taxpayer may-and must to the extent the statutory limitations
are exceeded-elect to capitalize such expenditures and
recover them through the depletion deduction. Some tax
counselors tend to confuse deferral and capitalization of
mineral exploration expenditures. If these are deferred, a
subsequent expense deduction is allowed against the production from the ore body discovered as a result of such expenditures. The taxpayer may also take depletion, which will
ordinarily be at the statutory rate since exploration expenditures do not become part of the taxpayer's basis for depletion
purposes. However, when such costs are deferred, they
become part of the taxpayer's basis in the mineral property
for purposes other than determining cost depletion. Alternatively, if the taxpayer capitalizes such expenses, they
become part of his basis for all purposes, including the determination of cost depletion. Since statutory depletion frequently exceeds cost depletion, the capitalization of such costs
often does not result in a tax benefit.88
36. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 615 (f).
37. Id. §§ 615(a)-(c) (1).
38. It is, of course, conceivable that with respect to high cost properties, cost
depletion will exceed statutory depletion. In addition, if the property is
sold, amounts capitalized will reduce any gain or increase a loss. Further, if
a property is abandoned, an ordinary loss deduction may be taken for any
amounts capitalized. See text accompanying notes 49-53 infra. However, the
IRS has adopted an approach with respect to capitalized exploration expenditures which generally precludes claiming any loss until all of the properties
benefited by such expenditures have been abandoned. See I.T. 4006, 1950-1
CuM. BuLL. 48; Bloomenthal, A Guide to Federal Mineral Income Taxation
(pt. 1), 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 77, 163-66 (1966).
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In contrast to the deduction for intangibles relating to
oil and gas operations discussed above, section 615 elections
can be made for separate properties, can be made in whole
or in part, and can differ in each tax year. A taxpayer could,
for example, deduct $10,000, defer $50,000, and capitalize
$20,000 of exploration expenditures in one tax year even
though incurred with respect to the same property. In a
following year he could make entirely different elections.
Should the taxpayer receive property through certain
types of non-taxable transfers, including a transfer for stock
in a controlled corporation 9 or in connection with a tax-free
corporate merger or other reorganization,"0 all exploratory
expenditures previously deducted or deferred by the transferor must be included in determining the transferee's $400,000
limitation. 4 ' Under section 1.615-4 of the regulations, such
amounts must be included, even if expended by the transferor
on properties other than those transferred to the taxpayer.4 2
The section 617 alternative with respect to exploration
expenditures was added in 1966 because of congressional
concern that many taxpayers had exhausted or were close to
exhausting the aggregate limits under section 615."3 For
taxpayers who have not exhausted such limits or are not close
to doing so, the logical procedure in most instances, in view
of the structure of the provisions and of the elections thereunder, would be to initially elect to be taxed under section
615. A taxpayer may, within three years after making such
an election, revoke his choice and, in effect, retroactively elect
for prior as well as future years to proceed under the provisions of section 617." On the other hand, if a taxpayer
initially chooses to proceed under section 617, his election
will be irrevocable once final regulations are adopted under
this section. An additional factor to consider is that section
615 is applicable to exploration expenditures regardless of
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 351(a), 362(a).
Id. §§ 362(b), 368(a).
Id. §§ 615(c) (2)-(3).
Treas. Reg. § 1.615-4 (1965).
S. REP. No. 1377, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, § 615(e).

The election cannot be revoked more than three months after the adoption
of the final regulations under § 17. See id. § 617(a) (2) (b). As of the date
of this writing (January 20, 1968), final regulations had not been adopted
and hence calendar year taxpayers electing § 617 treatment for 1967 will
still have a period of time in which to revoke their election.
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where incurred, whereas section 617 is applicable only with
respect to exploration expenditures incurred on properties
located within the United States or on its outer continental
shelf." Thus, if a taxpayer with substantial mineral operations outside the United States elected to proceed under
section 617, he could not deduct exploration expenditures on
such properties.
A corporation has its own election to make between
sections 615 and 617 and is subject to $100,000 and $400,000
limitations under section 615 separate from those imposed oil
its shareholders. 7 However, as previously noted, prior transfers to the corporation in nontaxable transactions may affect
the extent to which the aggregate limit is available to the
corporation. Similarly, each participant in a partnership can
make his own election between sections 615 and 617, and each
partner has his own separate aggregate and annual limitations under the provisions of section 615.8
A final deduction which is relevant to mineral operations
is the deduction for losses "incurred in a trade or business
or . . . in any transaction entered into for profit although
not connected with a trade or business." 4 9 Losses of this type
can be offset against ordinary income" and hence have a
distinct advantage over a long-term capital loss. In order to
qualify for this deduction, the loss must be bona fide and
"evidenced by closed and completed transactions, fixed by
identifiable events, and . . . actually sustained during the
taxable year." 5 The fact that an asset has lost all of its value
is a closed and completed transaction for this purpose.2
Events establishing such worthlessness with respect to mineral
properties usually involve drilling a dry hole in the case of
oil and gas, or comparable unsuccessful drilling or exploratory
work for other minerals, preferably, but not necessarily,
accompanied by abandonment of the mineral property
involved."
Id. § 617(a) (1).
A corporation is generally a separate tax entity. See id. § 11 (a).
Id. § 703(b).
Id. §§ 165(c) (1)-(2).
Id. § 165(a).
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (1960).
Cf. C.C. Harmon, 1 T.C. 40 (1942), aff'd on other grounds, 139 F.2d 211
(10th Cir. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
53. See generally Bloomenthal, A Guide to Federal Mineral Income Taxation
(pt. 1), 1 LAND & WATEa L. REv. 77, 154-57 (1966).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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The seven exploration funds examined all stressed the
tax benefits to be derived from the statutory depletion deduction and the optional deduction relating to intangible drilling
and development costs. Some of them also referred to the
deduction for worthlessness. In addition, all but one of the
prospectuses set forth the tax consequences in the form of an
opinion of counsel and in reliance on counsel as an expert.
Moreover, the prospectuses also unequivocally stated that in
the opinion of counsel, the "venture" would not be classified
as an association taxable as a corporation-a determination
which is critical to passing the deductions directly through
to the investor. This aspect of the tax problem, 5 ' and the
sponsors' tax problems arising out of the interest received
by them,5 5 are discussed in succeeding sections.
FORM OF ORGANIZATION-IN GENERAL

The agreements and arrangements employed by the seven
exploration funds generally reflect a high degree of professional competence on the part of counsel. Indeed, such skill
and ingenuity is requisite to achieving the following tax
objectives of the exploration fund: (1) the investors should
be permitted to take all of the deductions; (2) the investors
should bear the tax on all the income during "payout"; and
(3) the sponsor-manager should receive its interest in a nontaxable transaction.
A listing of the legal frameworks available for an exploration fund would include the following:
(1)

A fund could be organized as a corporation and could
issue the usual equity securities. If there were less
than ten shareholders involved and certain other
requirements were met,5 6 the corporation may elect
Subchapter S taxation. Such a corporation would
not differ substantially from other oil and gas or
mining companies which propose to engage primarily
in the acquisition and exploration of mineral proper-

54. See text accompanying notes 70-98 infra.
55. See text accompanying notes 99-141 infra.
56. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371 (a). To be eligible to make a Subchapter S
election, the corporation must not: (1) have more than 10 shareholders; (2)
have as a shareholder a trust, corporation, or person (other than an estate)
who is not an individual; (3) allow its shares to be held by a non-resident
alien; or (4) issue more than one class of stock. Id.
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ties. However, since the use of a Subchapter S corporation is limited to a fund with ten or less investors, it is generally unavailable if securities are
to be publicly offered.
(2) A fund could be organized as a limited partnership
with the sponsor acting as the general partner and
the investors as limited partners.
(3) A fund could be organized as a limited partnership
as in (2) with the limited partners as a group constituting a separate Subchapter S corporation.
(4) A fund could be organized as a general partnership.
The partners would be in all probability be few in
number, consisting only of the organizers. The
organizers in turn would offer and assign portions
of their interests in partnership profits without
having their assignees substituted as partners."
(5) A fund could be organized so that each of the participants in the fund held tenancies in common in any
mineral properties acquired. The co-owners could
then enter into an operating agreement designating
the sponsor as "operator" and specifying the respective rights and obligations of the parties.
(6) A fund could be organized as a "mining partnership" with the sponsor designated as managing
partner.
The foregoing represents the principal alternatives for
organizing an exploration fund, although obviously there are
numerous variations with respect to each. Of the seven funds
examined, three employed limited partnership arrangements
and four, while variously styled and differing in detail,
involved basically complicated co-ownership arrangements
with operating agreements.
FoRM OF ORGANIZATION-THE CORPORATION

The corporation, generally the most favored form of
business organization, is something of a stepchild in a mineral
exploration program designed to maximize tax advantages
57. Nonsubstituting assignments would not terminate the partnership. UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 27(1). Only the death of the original partners and not
that of the assignees would terminate the partnership. Id. § 31 (4).
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for the benefit of high-bracket taxpayers. The reasons for
this are at least threefold: (1) the usual double tax disadvantage involved in the use of a corporation; (2) the fact
that a distribution of depletion reserves is taxed as a dividend
rather than a return of capital to the extent statutory depletion exceeds cost depletion;5" and (3) the fact that the corporation form ordinarily does not permit tax deductions to
be passed through to the shareholders. The typical investor
in an exploration fund is looking for his own tax deductions
during the current year. The fact that the corporation may
have such tax deductions will not accomplish his objectives,
particularly if the entity has no offsetting income. Further,
if the exploration is successful, cash distributions to him will
be taxable to the extent statutory depletion exceeds cost depletion, depriving him in large part of the benefit of the statutory
depletion deduction. Finally, if the venture fails, the loss
resulting from the sale of his corporate shares or from the
worthlessness of the shares will be a capital rather than an
ordinary loss.9
If a private placement of fund shares is contemplated, a
fund organized as a corporation may be able to utilize Subchapter S and section 1244 to accomplish the desired tax
objectives. To achieve a Subchapter S election, of course,
participants must be limited to ten individual shareholders.
Assuming that Subchapter S is utilized, the deductions and
losses generated by the corporation can be passed through to
its shareholders.'" In subsequent years the shareholders may
find it advantageous to revoke the election,"' keeping most of
the earnings in the corporation and allocating the cash generated through the depletion reserve for further exploratory
ventures. In addition, a corporation could also issue section
1244 stock up to an aggregate of $500,000. To the extent
section 1244 stock is used, any loss realized as a result of the
sale of worthlessness of the stock can be taken as an ordinary
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.316-2(e) (1956).
59. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 165 (f)-(g).

60. Id. § 1374.

61. Revocation may be effected if consented to by all the shareholders. See id.
§ 1372(e) (2). A Subchapter S corporation with exploration deductions
subject to recapture under § 617, see text accompanying note 32 supra, may
find it advisable to revoke its election in the year in which income is to be
restored, since taxation of such restored income at corporate rates would
probably yield less tax liability than taxation at individual rates.
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loss. " However, the $500,000 limitation, along with other
section 1244 requirements," might undesirably limit the size
of the fund.
Subchapter S fails to remove one serious disadvantage
of the corporate form; i.e., distribution of depletion reserves
will generally be taxed as a dividend to the extent statutory
depletion exceeds cost depletion. Nevertheless, if such reserves are not distributed, they do not constitute part of the
corporation's undistributed net income for the purpose of
determining a shareholder's taxable share of corporate
income." Accumulation of depletion reserves in anticipation
of further exploration may be feasible in the case of a relatively close-knit group interested in ultimately building a
producing company. Presumably the investor-shareholder
would benefit from the corporate growth through the sale of
his shares or possibly upon the ultimate dissolution of the
corporation, both of which events would yield capital gain
treatment. It is essential, however, that the collapsible corporation provisions of the Code6" be avoided both with respect
to sales of shares by any participant with a greater than five
percent shareholding and upon liquidation of the corporation.
Generally these provisions do not pose problems for companies
developing mineral properties unless particular shareholders
can be classified as "dealers" for tax purposes. However, if
a shareholder-investor has been involved in other mineral
operations, he might find himself possessing the condemning
INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 1244(a).
Section 1244 (c) requires a plan under which stock is to be issued within
two years of its adoption. Further, the total of the equity capital of the
corporation on the adoption date and the aggregate amount to be issued
under the plan must not exceed $1,000,000.
64. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §§ 611, 1373(b)-(d).
65. Id. § 341. This provision converts what would be capital gain on some sales
of stock or liquidation into ordinary income and also limits the utilization of
§ 333 and § 337 liquidations. A corporation with undeveloped properties on
which oil is discovered is likely to be a "collapsible corporation" within the
definition of § 341(b) (1). See Honaker Drilling, Inc. v. Koehler, 190 F.
Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960). However, sales of stock by distributions in liquidation to shareholders owning less than 5% of the stock are, in effect,
excluded from the application of § 341 by the provisions of § 341 (d). Further, if the corporation's net unrealized appreciation in § 341(e) assets does
not exceed 15% of the corporation's net worth, and if no shareholder owning
more than 20% of the outstanding stock is a "dealer," the collapsible operation provisions will be inapplicable for most purposes. Generally, § 341 (e)
assets are those items such as inventory which produce ordinary income
when sold. Hence, an exploration and development company would not have
substantial assets of this nature unless it also traded in leases and other
mineral rights. For an excellent discussion of the complex collapsible
provisions see generally Pye, How To Avoid the Section 841 Trap in Dispos4012.
ing of Oil and Gas Interests, 1967 P-H OIL & GAs TAXEs
62.
63.
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qualifications. This could be particularly true of the managersponsor, assuming that he is a shareholder, or some of the
shareholder-investors who may have been tempted to participate in simultaneous drawings relating to federal oil and gas
leases.6" Moreover, the acquisition of such leases with a view
to reselling them to major oil companies is very likely to
yield dealer classification. 7
Even with a Subchapter S qualification, the corporate
form may be less desirable for a fund engaged in exploration
for minerals other than oil and gas. If such a corporation
utilized section 615, it would be subject to a single $100,000/
$400,000 limitation, whereas if the fund were organized as a
partnership, each partner would have a separate $100,000/
$400,000 limitation, thus permitting a greater exploration
deduction for the same "venture." 6 However, if some of the
individual shareholders had exhausted the section 615 limits,
the organization of a new corporation would create a new
section 615 deduction. Of course, the corporation might find
it advantageous to rely on the section 617 deduction.
Finally, if the manager-sponsor is an individual, it may
be feasible for him to become a shareholder in the Subchapter
S corporation. If, as is more likely, the manager-sponsor is
a corporation, it would have to remain outside of the Subchapter S entity in order to preserve the favored tax treatment. Thus, there may be certain advantages in the utilization
of a limited partnership consisting of the sponsor as general
partner and the Subchapter S corporation as the limited
partner. This approach is discussed further below."
Despite the tax difficulties attendant utilization of the
corporate form, it has many well-known advantages as a
vehicle for carrying on mineral operations, such as limited
66. For a discussion of federal oil and gas leases see text accompanying note
13 supra. Since original acquisition costs are deductible, e.g., Commissioner
v. Miller, 227 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1955); United States v. Dougan, 214 F.2d
511 (10th Cir. 1954), some high-bracket taxpayers are tempted to play the
federal "lottery."
67. Compare Green v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 645 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 717 (1944), with Chadwell v. United States, 44 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1300
(W.D. Okla. 1953).
68. See text accompanying notes 37-48 supra.
69. See text accompanying notes 135-41 infra. Presumably a preferable arrangement would allow the sponsor to become the general partner and the individual investors limited partners. See note 61 supra, however, for one
situation in which the use of a separate corporation as a limited partner
may be advantageous.
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liability, free transferability of interests, convenience of centralized management, relative liquidity for investors, perpetual existence, continuity of existence, and well established
legal doctrines defining the relationships, obligations, and
rights of the participants.
FoRM OF ORGANIZATION-CO-OWNERS

JOINT

OPERATING AGREEMENT

In the past co-ownership operating agreements have
typically related to the development of a specific property in
which the investors become co-tenants by acquiring fractional
undivided interests and then designate one of the co-owners
as operator." Because of the widespread use of such agreements, particularly in connection with farm-outs, they have
become reasonably standardized. Nevertheless, the four
exploration funds employing this device have utilized some
ingenious adaptations.7 The exploration fund usually has no
properties at its outset. Thus, a contractual agreement is
entered into under which the investors agree to advance funds
and the sponsor agrees to acquire and drill oil and gas properties with such funds. Once a property is acquired, the investor
becomes co-owner of the property and operations are carried
on under a more or less standard operating agreement designating the manager as operator. Title to properties is generally taken in the name of a nominee, although at least one
fund agrees to assign to the investor his fractional undivided
interest upon demand.
One explanation of the popularity of such arrangements
is the fact that each co-owner can take his proportionate
share of the deductions. However, it is essential that the
group of co-owners avoid classification as an association which
is taxable as a corporation. Absent an organization utilized
for joint-profit purposes, there is no association.7 2 Based on
70. Co-ownership operating agreements may result from the sale of undivided
interests for the purpose of raising funds to explore a specific property, see
note 9 supra, or from a farm-out arrangement under which the owner of a
lease, for example, conveys an undivided one-half interest in return for the
assignee's commitment to drill a well at the assignee's expense and risk.
71. The three funds examined which were organized as limited partnerships also
utilized standard operating agreement arrangements between the limited
partnership and the party responsible for carrying out drilling activities,
who was usually an affiliate of the sponsor.
72. The Code defines a corporation to include "associations." INT. REV. CODE
op 1954, § 7701(a) (3). "Since associates and an objective to carry on business for joint profit are essential characteristics of all organizations engaged
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administrative rulings of the IRS, the question of whether
co-owners have joint-profit objectives is determined by the
arrangements relating to the marketing of mineral production.7 Thus, practitioners have assumed that considerable, if
not complete, control can be vested in the operator in carrying
on the mineral operation provided each individual co-owner
retains control over the disposition of his share of production.
Standard provisions designed to accomplish such a result
recite that each co-owner reserves the right to receive his
proportionate share of production in kind, and that until the
exercise of such right, the operator shall have revocable
authority as the co-owner's agent to dispose of production
and to enter into contracts for the sale of production provided
such contracts do not exceed the minimum needs of the industry and in no event are for a period in excess of one year. The
operator may have similar revocable authority from other
non-operators without condemning the "entity" as an association. If, however, the operator has irrevocable authority from
two or more co-owners to dispose of production, or has revocable authority permitting him to contract for periods exceeding the minimum needs of the industry or one year, whichever
is less, the entity will be considered an association and hence
taxed as a corporation.
All of the four funds utilizing this type of arrangement
contained the standard provisions giving each co-owner" control" over his share of production. The fund agreement,
however, enhances the control usually exercised by the operator by designating him manager of the fund, for this position
generally grants him unlimited discretion as to the acquisition, exploration, and operation of mineral properties. Yet,
all four prospectuses included opinions of counsel that the
arrangement was not an association taxable as a corporation,
and two of them referred to prior favorable rulings from the
IRS with respect to similar funds. Nonetheless, the irvestorco-owner's mere theoretical right to control the disposition
of his share of production provides at best an unstable basis
for the conclusion that a pooling of funds by several investors
in business for profit . . . the absence of either of these essential characteristics will cause an arrangement among co-owners . . .of such property
for the separate profit of each not to be classified as an association." Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2)

(1960).

73. I.T. 3948, 1949-1 CUM. BuLL. 161; I.T. 3930, 1948-2 Cum. BULL. 126.
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with a sponsor who has such unrestricted control is not a
joint-profit enterprise. One Tenth Circuit decision,"4 for
example, has looked through the somewhat artificial assumptions behind the administrative rulings and concluded that
the co-ownership arrangement there in question was an a ssociation subject to taxation as a corporation, even though for
the most part it complied with the IRS's pronouncements.
The Service, however, has never repudiated these rulings and
has generally shown a disposition to depart from them only
in those instances in which complete compliance was
questioned."'
Assuming that a co-ownership arrangement can avoid
classification as an association, it will be taxed as a partnership" unless the co-owners elect to be treated as joint owners,
taxed individually and not as partners." All of the operating
agreements utilized by the four funds examined above made
the appropriate election for exclusion from the partnership
provisions (Subchapter K) of the Code.
FORm OF ORGANIZATION-PARTNESHIPS

The partnership, particularly a limited partnership, is
in many respects an ideal form of organization for an exploration fund and, as previously noted, three of the seven funds
examined were limited partnerships. If, however, the tax
advantages of utilizing the partnership form are to be realized, it is essential that the partnership not be classified as
an association taxable as a corporation." Under the formula
set forth in the current regulations, neither the typical general
partnership nor the typical limited partnership organized
under the Uniform Partnership and Uniform Limited Part74. United States v. Stierwalt, 287 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1961).
75. See John Provence #1 Well v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1963).
See also Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
76. Bentex Oil Corp., 20 T.C. 565 (1953); I.T. 2785, XIII-1 CuM. BULL. 96
(1934). See also Rev. Rul. 54-84, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 284. If the coownership arrangement is taxed like a partnership, it is important that the
"partnership" make the appropriate election to deduct intangibles. See text
accompanying notes 22-37 supra. If election is not made by the partnership,
the individual partners will have to capitalize such expenditures.
77. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 761(a). Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (2) (iv) (1956)
outlines the procedure to be followed by partners making an election to be
taxed individually.
78. Although § 7701 (a) (2) of the Code presents a definition of "partnership,"
this separate treatment does not preclude the application of § 7701(a) (3)
which defines a "corporation" to include "associations." See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-8(b) (1960).
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nership Acts is such an association." Futhermore, these
regulations appear to be motivated by a desire to deny professional associations corporate status for tax purposes."0
Nonetheless, a careful practitioner may wish to adopt additional safeguards in drafting a limited partnership agreement
to guard against the condemning classification. It is believed
that the inclusion of the following provisions will be helpful
for this purpose:
(1) Termination of the partnership within a specified
period of time. This may be coupled with another provision that the partnership shall continue thereafter on
a year-to-year basis with the general partners having the
right to terminate at the end of each year upon giving
advance notice.
(2) Termination of the partnership in the event of death,
insanity, withdrawal, or bankruptcy of a general partner.
This may be coupled with a provision that the partnership may continue with unanimous consent of the limited
and general partners.
(3) Unrestricted withdrawal rights for general partners.
This is an aspect of (2) above.
(4) Termination of the partnership upon assignment of
the interest of a general partner. This may be coupled
with a provision that such an assignment may be made
with unanimous consent.
79. The critical characteristics of a corporation under the IRS formula are:
(1) continuity of life; (2) centralization of management; (3) limited liability; and (4) free transferability of interests. To be classified as an
association the organization must have more corporate characteristics than
noncorporate characteristics. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (a) (3) (1960). Thus,
the regulations provide that centralized management does not exist in a
limited partnership organized under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
unless substantially all of the partnership interests are owned by the limited
partners. Id. § 301.7701-2(c) (4). The regulations also provide that personal
liability does exist as to the general partner in such a limited partnership
unless he has no substantial assets other than his interest in the partnership and he is merely a "dummy" acting as agent of the limited partners.
Even if he were such a "dummy," the limited partners would have personal
liability. Id. § 301.7701-2 (d) (2). Accordingly, a limited partnership, which
does not ordinarily have centralized management or limited liability, is not
an association under the formula.
80. The refusal to extend corporate status to professional associations is, of
course, an attempt to deny such organizations the benefit of qualified
pension and profit sharing plans under Subchapter D of the Code. In view
of the liberalization of the tax laws relating to comparable Keogh plans for
the self-employed, this motivation has disappeared in part, although not
entirely. See Keogh-Smathers Act, 76 Stat. 809 (1962) (now INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 401t 404).
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The purpose of the foregoing provisions obviously is to preclude the partnership from having continuity of existence and
free transferability of interests. Undoubtedly, practitioners
will differ as to the necessity for including all of these
provisions. 1
Unlike the corporate form of organization, the partnership alternative avoids the taxation of distributed statutory
depletion reserves.8 2 First, partnership distribution in excess
of basis are taxed, but only at capital gain rates.8" Secondly,
and most important, each partner's basis in the partnership
is increased ratably to the extent statutory depletion exceeds
cost depletion. 4 Accordingly, in most instances the distribution of depletion reserves merely reduces the basis by a corresponding amount and, hence, is not taxable.
The use of the partnership form generally will permit the
investors in an exploration fund to derive the benefit of tax
deductions which would not have passed through the corporate
form. While depletion will be taken by the partnership, the
effect is to reduce the individual partner's share of partnership taxable income. Further, as noted above, distribution of
depletion reserves can ordinarily be made to the partners
without adverse tax consequences. Moreover, the deduction
for intangible drilling and development costs incurred in
preparing oil and gas wells is taken directly by the individual
partners." Yet, it is important to note that the election to
81. If the sponsor-manager/general partner retains only an interest in profits,
it might be argued, though not very convincingly, that centralized management exists on the theory that the limited partners own substantially all of
the interests in the partnership. See note 79 supra. However, notwithstanding the statement in the regulations that a limited partnership does
not ordinarily possess centralized management, see id., the limited partnership exemplifies the regulation's general definition of that characteristic:
"An organization has centralized management if any person (or any group
of persons.. .) has continuing exclusive authority to make the management
decisions necessary to the conduct of the business for which the organization
was formed." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1) (1960). Paragraph (1) of
the text is probably not sufficient to avoid "continuity of life" unless coupled
with paragraph (2). See id. § 301.7701-2(b) (1). In addition to paragraph
(4) of the text, which relates to free transferability of interests, it may be
desirable to limit assignments by the limited partners, since with such
limitations it is clear under the regulations that free transferability does
not exist. If interests can be transferred subject to a right of first refusal,
"a modified form of free transferability exists" which will be accorded less
significance in determining association classification than if present in an
unmodified form. See id. § 301.7701-2 (e). In the author's judgment, it is
advisable to take all possible precautions to avoid association classification.
82. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
83. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 731(a) (1), 741.
84. Id. § 705(a) (1) (c).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1 (a) (8) (1956).
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deduct these costs must be made by the partnership,8 6 and the
failure of the partnership to elect such a deduction in the
appropriate year will result in the capitalization of these
expenditures." Until the 1966 amendments adding section
617 of the Code, the partnership was similarly to elect whether
exploration expenditures relating to minerals other than oil
and gas were to be deducted or capitalized; but the individual
partners took such deduction directly into their own tax
accounting."8 However, with the advent of section 617, the
individual partners also make their own separate elections
under sections 615 or 617.9 As previously noted, one of the
advantages of a partnership over a corporation in this regard
is the flexibility with respect to such elections, for each individual partner is subject to separate limitations under section
615,90 while those involved in an incorporated enterprise are
allowed only one ceiling, that which can be taken by the entity.
The deduction for development expenditures relating to
minerals other than oil and gas is taken by the partnership,
but, as in the case of the depletion deduction, this has the
effect of reducing each partner's distributive share of partnership taxable income.'
The extent to which the partnership form permits flexibility in allocating deductions to the investors is discussed at
some length below in connection with the related problem of
86. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 703(b).
87. Cf. Bentex Oil Corp., 20 T.C. 565 (1953); Rev. Rul. 54-42, 1954-1 CuM.
BULL. 64; I.T. 3713, 1945-1 CUM. BULL. 178.
88. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.702-1(a)(8), 1.703-1(b) (1956).
89. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 703 (b) : "Any election affecting the computation
of taxable income derived from a partnership shall be made by the partnership . . . and any election under section 615 . . . or under section 617
shall be made by each partner separately."
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1 (a) (8) (1956).
91. As is well known, a partnership as such is not subject to tax, although the
partnership computes its taxable income and files an information return.
Rather, the individual partners are taxed on their distributive shares of
partnership taxable income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 701-704. Since
development expenditures are not among those items which § 702 requires
each partner to take into account separately, they are considered in determining the taxable income of the partnership. As to minerals other than
oil and gas, development expenditures such as stripping costs and the cost
of sinking a shaft can be deducted, deferred, or capitalized in much the
same manner as exploration expenditures under § 615, see text accompanying notes 22-48 sup-ta, but there is no limit on the amount that can be
deducted or deferred, see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 616. While such development deductions are important with respect to the development of established ore bodies, they are not likely to play an important role in the
formative stage of an exploration fund and hence have not been emphasize-i
in this article. For a discussion of § 616 see generally Bloomenthal, A Guide
to Federal Mineral Income Taxation (pt. 1), 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 77,
121-24 (1966).
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the tax consequences of the sponsor's acquisition of an interest
in the mineral properties.2
FoRm OF ORGANIZATION-THE MINING PARTNERSHIP

The mining partnership is a distinct and somewhat unique
form of business entity which developed to meet the needs of
prospector-oriented financing of the early mining days in
the West." While it is possible that co-ownership arrangements may result in inadvertent classification as a mining
partnership for certain purposes," it is also conceivable that
The organizers of an exploration fund might deliberately
create such an arrangement. A mining partnership differs
from a general partnership in that the death, insanity, or
bankruptcy of a partner does not terminate the partnership;
interests may be freely assigned with the assignee of a partnership interest substituted as a partner; a majority in interest can bind the dissenting partners, while individual partners
have no authority to bind the partnership; and, although the
managing partner has considerable inherent authority in the
conduct of partnership affairs, this authority is said to be less
than that possessed by a managing partner in an ordinary
partnership. 5 A mining partnership may not, however, be
an attractive vehicle for organizing an exploration fund, since
investors will be subject to unlimited liability." Also, this
form is more likely to be characterized as an association taxable as a corporation than is a limited or general partnership.
Since there exists free transferability of interests, continuity
of life, and a form of centralized management, only one of
the four characteristics-limited liability--of a corporation
which the IRS regards as significant is missing. Thus, under
the IRS formula that an organization will be classified as an
association when it has more corporate than non-corporate
characteristics, the ordinary mining partnership would appear
to be an association taxable as a corporation." Appropriate
'92. See text accompanying notes 128-41 infra.
-.93. See generally 4 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, AMERICAN
LAW OF MINING §§ 22.27-.47 (1960). California, Idaho, and Montana have
statutory provisions relating to mining partnerships but generally these
statutes are largely declaratory of the "common law." Id. 22.31. It is
interesting to note that mining partnerships also have English antecedents.
See generally Kahn v. Smelting Co., 102 U.S. 641, 645 (1880).
94. See text accompanying notes 211-12 infra.
95.

4 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 93, §§ 22.33-.40.

.96. Id. §§ 22.44-.45.
97. See note 79 supra.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss1/1

30

Bloomenthal: Mineral Exploration Funds

1969

MINERAL EXPLORATION FUNDS

drafting, however, might limit continuity and/or transferability,"5 with the result that the four crucial elements would
be equally balanced. Such drafting may be sufficient to avoid
association classification, particularly in view of the informal
structuring of centralized management in a mining partnership. Nevertheless, the practitioner would be well advised to
obtain a ruling from the IRS before relying on this form
with the expectation that condemning classification can be
avoided. Finally, it should be noted that a partnership
engaged in mining activities is not per se a "mining partnership." However, in utilizing a partnership form for an
exploration fund, it may be advisable to provide expressly
that the partnership either shall or shall not be deemed a
mining partnership.
ALLOCATING DEDUCTIONS TO INVESTORS AND THE EFFECT ON
THE SPONSOR'S INTEREST

The seven funds examined all attempted to allocate the
deduction for intangibles to the investors, which necessarily
affects the type of interest to be received by the sponsor. The
arrangement most favored was to provide that the sponsor's
interest in the properties should be in the nature of a "carried
interest." Under this arrangement the sponsor is not entitled
to any part of the proceeds from production until the investors
have received all costs of drilling, completing, and operating
the well. Thereafter, the sponsor receives his designated
share of production and pays his proportionate share of
operating costs. Two of the funds granted the sponsor a net
operating profit interest. Since under such an arrangement
expenditures for drilling and completing the well are not
included as costs in determining net operating profits, the
sponsor is permitted to participate immediately in proceeds
from production. One of the funds retained a small overriding royalty percentage which could be converted after
payout into a net profit interest percentage. It is interesting
to note that in the three limited partnerships in which the
general partner was the sponsor, participation in the venture
98.

There would appear to be little purpose in forming a mining partnership,
and presumably a limited partnership would be a preferable vehicle. About
the only advantage from the standpoint of the investors is that the mining
partnership would offer them some participation in the management of
partnership affairs.
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was achieved by the grant of a property interest rather than
a share of partnership profits.9
The arrangements employed by the seven funds seem to
be well designed to achieve the reasonable objective of the
parties that investors retain the deduction for intangibles and
pay tax on all the income received by them during payout.
However, the arrangements may result in receipt by the
sponsor of taxable income to the extent of the value of the
interest he received. Further, because of the unsettled tax
lore relating to carried interest arrangements, minor differences in form may upset the tax planning objectives. The
following are illustrative of the difficulties encountered by
plans utilizing a carried interest:
(1) Under one arrangement, usually characterized as a
Manahan'°° carried interest, L, the owner of the lease, assigns
the entire lease to 0, the operator, with a provision to the
effect that upon complete payout..' a one-half interest in the
lease is to revert to L. Under this arrangement 0 reports one
hundred percent of the proceeds as taxable income during
payout and takes one hundred percent of the deductions.
These are the tax consequences that the IRS appears to favor,
and hence it usually is contending for a Manahan approach.
Proposed regulations, since withdrawn, relating to the deduction for intangibles expressly adopted an approach that is
compatible with this result.'"'
(2) Under a second arrangement, referred to as an Abercronbie0 5 carried interest, L assigns to 0 a fifteen-sixteenths
interest in a lease which provides that 0 is to be entitled to
99. For a possible explanation of why this was done see notes 128-29 in fra and
accompanying text. One of the three limited partnership funds retained an
overriding royalty in the property, but created a hybrid by providing that
its income from this source would be its share of partnership profits.
Another of the funds retained no interest in the exploratory well drilled,
but received a working interest in the adjoining acreage.
100. Manahan Oil Co., 8 T.C. 1159 (1947). The actual facts of this case differed
from those presented In the text in that the holder of the lease assigned only
one-half of this interest and permitted the assignee to receive the income and
take the deductions attributable to an additional one-fourth of the assignor's
original interest until the payout was completed.
101. "Payout" occurs at the point of time at which the cumulative aggregate net
revenues from operations are precisely equal to the drilling and completion
costs.
102. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (2) (4), 25 Fed. Reg. 3761 (1960), withdrawn by T.D. 6836, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 182. The withdrawal of the regulation probably does not reflect a change of position in this regard by the
IRS. See K. MILLER, OIL & GAS FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION 205 n.2 (1967).
103. Commissioner v. J.S. Abercrombie Co., 162 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1947).
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all of the proceeds during the payout period. In Commissioner v. J. S. Abercrombie Company,' the Fifth Circuit held
that 0 had in effect made a loan to L of the amounts advanced
to pay L's proportionate share of the cost. Hence, the proceeds attributed to L's interest during payout, although
actually received by 0, were taxable to L. It follows from this
approach that L can deduct his proportionate share of the
intangibles. The Fifth Circuit has held that L can take such
a deduction at the time of the expenditure, even though there
is no guarantee that production from the well will be sufficient
to assure payout.'
However, Weinert v. Commissioner,'"
a more recent Fifth Circuit decision, suggests that this court
is about to abandon Abercrombie and adopt the Manahan
approach in this situation as well. Interestingly enough,
although the Commissioner at one time acquiesced in Aber0 8 result,
crombie, 0 ' he has generally argued for a Manahan"
probably because of his occasional lack of success with the
Abercrombie approach. " The withdrawn proposed regulations dealing with intangibles gave what is in effect an
Aberorombie example and applied to this example the
Manahan result.1 0
(3) Under a third arrangement, the Herndon"' carried
interest, L assigns to 0 both a one-half interest in the lease
and an oil payment to be made out of one hundred percent of
L's reserved interest until 0 has recovered therefrom the
amount of L's share of drilling, completion, and operating
costs. The assumed result under this approach has been to
permit 0 to deduct only one-half of the intangibles; to deny
L the right to deduct any intangibles, since they are not
incurred by him; and to tax 0 on one hundred percent of
the proceeds, half of which 0 receives from his undivided
interest and the balance of which is received from the oil
payment.
Between 1956 and July 15, 1965, the Internal Revenue
Service had under consideration proposed regulations which
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Prater v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1959).
294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961).
1949-1 CUM. BULL. 1.
See Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750, 757 n.14 (5th Cir. 1961).
Id.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (a) (4), 25 Fed. Reg. 3761 (1960) (example 1).
Herndon Drilling Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 628 (1946).
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would have eliminated in large part the uncertainty relating
to carried interests and other sharing arrangements.112 The
proposed regulations as revised in 1960 made it clear that, in
a Manahan type carry, the carrying party could deduct all of
the intangibles. Also included was an example from which it
could be concluded that the same result would follow under
an Aberorombie type of interest. Such a result would have
been consistent with the withdrawal by the Service of its prior
acquiescence in Abercrombie.. and the Fifth Circuit's repudiation of Abercrombie in the Weinert case." 4 Yet, no sooner
had the situation been crystallized after twenty-three years
of doubt than the IRS restored the prior chaotic conditions by
withdrawing its proposed provisions. The regulations finally
adopted were substantially identical to the 1939 regulations
in their silence as to allocation of the intangibles deduction. 1
The adoption of the final regulations was accompanied by an
announcement indicating a willingness to entertain requests
for rulings in appropriate cases and stating that "[i]n such
rulings, the decision of the Service will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case.""16
Of the carried interest arrangements in the funds examined, three appear to be of the Manahan type, whereas one
could be classified as an Abercrombie carry. If the IRS and
the courts were to apply the Abercrombie rationale, the investors in all these funds would lose part of the deduction for
intangibles. Despite the withdrawal of the proposed regulations, however, it is believed that the IRS has no desire to
revive Abercrombie.' 7 Nevertheless, in view of the expressed
willingness of the Service to grant rulings in this context, it
would appear advisable for interested parties to obtain one.
The net operating profit arrangements employed by two
of the funds as well as the retained override arrangement
should permit their investors to take the deduction for intangibles." 8 On the other hand, the net profit arrangement has an
112. See note 102 supra.
113. 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 5.
114. Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961). See text accompanying note 106 supra.
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (1965).
116. Announcement 65-63, 1965 INT. REv. BULL. No. 34, at 53.
117. See K. MILLER, supra note 102, at 212 n.23.
118. See Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946); Kirby
Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946); G.C.M. 22,730, 1941-1
CuM. BULL. 214.
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adverse impact on the sponsor, since it will have to compute
statutory depletion on net income from production rather
than a percentage of gross income."' In the view taken by
the IRS, the net amount received by the holder of a net profit
interest represents his gross income from production.
While net profit and override agreements permit investors to take the depreciation deduction on tangible equipment, 2 ' carried interest arrangements which vest a portion
of the ownership of such equipment in the sponsors after
payout will to that extent preclude a depreciation deduction.
The investors are unable to take advantage of the deduction
because they no longer own an interest in the equipment, and
the deduction will not be available to the sponsor because it
has no basis in such equipment. Conceivably this result could
be avoided by the investors' retaining title to all of the equipment even after payout, but there is a risk that such a retained
interest might be classified as a net profit interest.
The principal disadvantage of the arrangement employed
by the seven funds examined is the likelihood that the sponsor
will be taxed to the extent of the value of the interest it
received. An analysis of this problem requires an understanding of the sharing arrangement or pool-of-capital doctrine established in connection with mineral operations in
1925.21 It has been clear since that time that if one owns
mineral rights and agrees to transfer an interest in those
rights in return for an agreement to drill a well, the transaction is non-taxable as to both parties. According to the
underlying rationale the owner of the mineral property has
not sold an interest in the property, but rather has pooled
his resources with the party who obligates himself to drill
the well.
The same rationale was extended by G.C.M. 22,7302' to
situations in which an owner exchanges an interest in his
119. Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946); Grandview
Mines v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1960).
120. The availability of the depreciation deduction is based upon the fact that
the investors will be the sole owners of the working interest and will have
a basis in the equipment. Care must be taken in drafting the net profit
interest to provide that the owner thereof acquires no interest in the equipment. As to the carried interest, the IRS apparently requires the carrier
at payout to reduce its undepreciated tangible equipment account and to
increase its leasehold account by a corresponding amount. See K. MILLER,
supra note 102, at 214.
121M.191Cum.
112 Treas.
(1921). Reg. § 1.612-4 (a) (1965).
122. 1941-13322,
Cum.IV-1
BULL.
214.BULL.
See also
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mineral property for supplies and equipment used in the
drilling of a well, for the services of a drilling contractor, or
for money pledged to the development of the property. It
has been widely assumed that under this reasoning, geological,
engineering, or legal services could be exchanged for an
interest in mineral property, provided such services related
to the acquisition, exploration, or development of the property, and that the transaction would otherwise be non-taxable.12 '
However, the IRS now takes the position that the sharing
agreement rationale is not applicable to the contribution of
personal services. While it may be difficult to justify distinguishing such services from those rendered by a drilling contractor,"' recent Fifth Circuit decisions tend to support the
IRS position. In James A. Lewis Engineering,Incorporated
v. Commissioner,'25 that court, although not explicitly invalidating the sharing-agreement theory as applied to personal
services, held that the services of a petroleum engineer in
planning a secondary recovery program were not rendered in
connection with "the acquisition, exploration or development"
of the mineral property. However, in dicta the court did state:
Unless a careful analysis of the reasons underlying
the issuing of G.C.M. 22,730 compelled it, the Court
would have great difficulty accepting a construction
of the Code that would fly in the face of the general
provisions of the tax laws to the effect that compensation for services must be returned as a part of
gross income. 2 '
Further, in United States v. Frazell,2 the parties apparently
contemplated a sharing arrangement involving services. However, the court concluded that the property interest received
for services was taxable as income. The court viewed the issue
as a problem of partnership taxation and did not refer to
either the sharing arrangement rationale or G.C.M. 22,730.
The facts in Frazell were very similar to those involved in a
typical exploration fund, though on a smaller scale. A geologist worked out an arrangement with two investors under
123. For an excellent discussion see generally Shelton, The Taxation of Oil and
Gas Interests Received in Payment for Property or Services, 5 OIL & GAS
INST. 385 (1954).
124. See K. MILiER, supra note 102, at 21-23.
125. 339 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1964).
126. Id. at 709.
127. 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 339 F.2d 885 (1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965).
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which he Was to provide advice in the acquisition and exploration of mineral properties financed by them in return for
a carried interest which "vested" in the Manahan sense after
the investors recovered their investment. The parties, with
their apparent acquiescence, were assumed to have formed a
partnership. On this basis, the court held that the geologist
realized income to the extent of the value of the interest
received in the year of vesting. The court then proceeded to
determine the value of the interest at the time of payout.
While Frazell is complicated by the fact that the parties
formed a corporation prior to payout, it is clear that payout
ordinarily would be regarded as the time of vesting. It would
appear from the court's approach, however, that, depending
upon whether a Manahan or Abercrombie type carried interest
is reserved, there may be a difference in the year in which
the income is received. Whereas in the case of a Manahan
carry the appropriate year would be the year of payout, an
Abercrombie carry would produce a tax in the year in which
the interest was created. If production from the property
is insufficient to return initial costs such as that for drilling,
a Manahan carried interest will be advantageous, since the
interest of the sponsor will never vest. Conversely, if oil is
found in commercial quantities an Abercrombie interest is
preferable, since the interest of the sponsor presumably has
less value prior to drilling than it will have after payout.
A sponsor retaining a carried interest in property it
contributed to the exploration fund could probably avail itself
of the sharing arrangement rationale. The fund must, however, possess such property prior to raising money from the
public. If the funds examined above provide a reliable guide,
however, this is not the usual procedure. While in many
instances the sponsor does acquire properties, which it then
transfers to the fund with a retained carried interest, these
properties are usually acquired with fund monies. Thus, it is
apparent that the sponsor is receiving its interest in exchange
for the management services provided and not because it
contributed the properties. In fact, most of the prospectuses
examined specified that the sponsor received its interest in
return for its know-how and professional efforts. Apparently, the sponsor is either accepting taxable income to the
extent of the value of the interest or anticipating the applicaPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1969
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tion of G.C.M. 22,730 to personal services. Even if one could
disregard Lewis and Frazell in this context, G.C.M. 22,730
has always required that the interest be acquired in properties with respect to which the services were rendered. Since
some services-arranging and managing the overall financial
program and screening properties which are not acquiredoften are unrelated to any particular property, it is arguable
that, in part at least, the sponsor's interest in a particular
property is received for unrelated services.
The three funds which employed a limited partnership
attempted to give the sponsor its interest outside of the partnership. This fact suggests that counsel may have sought to
avoid the impact of Frazell, which was decided in the context
of the partnership provisions of the Code. This attempted
evasion may be a futile gesture, however. A carried interest
arrangement will probably always result in taxable income
to the sponsor unless a convincing rebuttal is proposed to the
Fifth Circuit's premise in the Lewis case that property received as compensation for services yields taxable income.
The Frazell decision is best explained by the fact that the
taxpayer in that case planned a sharing arrangement, but
was trapped under a partnership rationale which should not
have been applicable to the particular facts. It would appear
that the key to the Frazel decision is the court's statementapparently correct on the particular facts-that the amounts
recovered by the other partners represented a "skimming of
profits"'2 8 rather than a return of capital; therefore, the
service-partner received an interest in the other partners'
capital accounts. Appropriate drafting of the partnership
agreement could avoid the Frazelt result by limiting the
service-partner to a share of the profits plus his own capital
account and precluding any portion of the other partners'
capital accounts from vesting in the service partner. There
are, of course, alternative methods of accomplishing this
result, each of which has varying economic and tax consequences. Such arrangements include the following:
128.

339 F.2d at 886. The court's conclusion came in response to the argument
that Treas. Reg. § 1.721-(1) (b) (1) 1956, while providing exempt status
for repayment of contributions to a partner, does not extend to the relinquishment by a partner of his right to repayment in favor of another
partner as compensation for the latter's services.
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(1) The sponsor-partner and the investor-partners immediately share in the profits, but the latter recover their
investment as a return of capital from the first available
funds. Assuming that all of the deductions have been allocated to the investor-partners and that their respective capital
accounts are reduced to the extent of the deductions, this
approach will ensure a "payout period" considerably shorter
than that incurred under the typical carried arrangement.
While the investor-partners are allocated all of the deductions, the sponsor-partner will pay tax on its share of partnership income during the abbreviated payout period even though
it is not receiving any distributions. Thus, the economic
impact is that the investor-partners recover as a return of
capital a portion of their investment and the sponsor-partner
builds up a corresponding amount of capital but at a tax
cost to it.
(2) The sponsor-partner immediately shares in partnership profits and distributions. Under this arrangement, the
sponsor-partner will be paying tax on his share of the income
and will have offsetting distributions from the partnership.
The economic effect is that the sponsor-partner's capital
account will not catch up with that of the investor-partners,
since the latter's "preference' '--original investment reduced
by the deductions allocated to it-will be delayed until
dissolution.
(3) All of the partnership income and deductions are
allocated to the investor-partners until their original investment has been returned in the form of partnership profits.
During payout the investor-partners will be taxed on all of
the partnership income and the sponsor-partner will incur
no tax. Thus, during payout the sponsor-partner is neither
receiving income nor building up a capital account. The
investor-partners, on the other hand, recover all of their
investment and, in addition, have a "preference" on dissolution to the extent of their original capital contributions less
the deductions allocated to them during payout. This
approach appears to be most in accord with the general objectives being sought by most exploration funds. Whichever
method is chosen, however, the partnership arrangements
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1969
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will have the additional advantage of permitting all of the
depreciation deduction to be utilized."2 9
It is essential to note that the court in the Frazell case
seemed at times to be equating the capital contribution of
partners with the assets acquired with such contributions. If
such equation gains further judicial acceptance, the foregoing analysis of Frazell is not correct.
The above planning techniques are, of course, oversimplified, for attention must also be given allocation of depletion
reserves and capital gains and losses. 3 ' However, with careful planning it should be possible to accomplish the general
objectives sought and at the same time avoid giving the
sponsor-partner an interest in the investor-partners' capital
accounts. When this result is achieved, section 1.721-1(b) (1)
of the regulations should be applicable. This section was not
applicable in Frazell because, after the investor-partners
recovered their investment from a skimming of profits, the
service-partner received an interest in the whole ball of wax,
which necessarily included part of the investor-partners'
capital accounts.
As a general rule the allocation of income and losses
among partners will be sustained if such allocation has econoSince the partnership would own all of the equipment and thus have a basis,
it would take the depreciation deduction. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 702-03.
For discussion of a comparable problem if a carried interest arrangement
is utilized see text accompanying note 120 supra.
130. The assistance of a knowledgeable accountant may be helpful in avoiding an
inadvertent distribution of any part of the investor-partner's capital
accounts to the service-partner. An additional problem arises from the fact
that the regulations do not refer to the accounting concept of capital
accounts, but rather to the right of a partner under partnership law to be
repaid his capital contribution.
Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b) (1) (1956) is based upon the principle of partnership law that each partner is normally entitled to be repaid his contribution of money or other property. Thus, the service-partner realizes income
when this right--as distinguished from a sharing of the profits--is invaded.
The easiest method of avoiding such invasion and of complying with the regulation would be to treat contributions as loans and to provide for repayment
of them, a plan which would have the same effect as illustration (2) in the
text and involve a tax cost to the service-partner. Alternatively such
amounts could be treated as a "preference" on dissolution and, thus, be left
unaffected by allocation of deductions to the investor-partners. However,
it would be highly questionable whether such allocations have economic
effect. If they do not, they will be disallowed. See note 132 infra. Assume
that during a period of time the investor-partners are entitled to all of the
profits and take all of the losses and deductions, thereby reducing their
capital account to the extent losses and deductions exceed profits. This
arrangement would appear to be consistent with the regulations, since
partnership law provides that each partner shall be repaid his contributions
and share in profit and losses with partners' contributions being preferred
upon dissolution. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 18 (a), 40.
129.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss1/1

40

Bloomenthal: Mineral Exploration Funds

1969

mic effect.'

9MINEBAL EXPLORATION FUNDS
The allocations outlined above clearly would

qualify, since in each instance they affect the partners' capital
accounts and, thus, the amounts ultimately received. While
deductions might be allocated to the investor-partners without
reducing their capital accounts by a corresponding amount,
varying economic results would still be achieved in each of
the above examples.' 3 2
It should be noted that to the extent deductions result in
losses allocable to the investor-partners, these partners cannot
take such losses in excess of their basis in the partnership."'
The tax opinions reflected in the prospectuses of the funds
examined fail to note this limitation. Since many of the
deductions are taken directly by the partner-intangibles in
the case of oil and gas, exploration expenditures in the case
of other minerals-it may be questioned whether these are
subject to the same limitations. The Code does not literally
impose an equivalent restriction on direct deductions, although
capital losses, which are also claimed individually by the
partners, are specifically limited to the individual's partnership basis. Nonetheless, it is probably advisable to assume
that such deductions are subject to a similar limitation, particularly in view of the fact that the Code requires the
partner's basis to be reduced by an amount corresponding to
the deduction, but explicitly disallows any reduction below
zero."'
If a Subchapter S corporation were utilized to form an
exploration fund and the sponsor were a shareholder, his
receipt of stock in return for services".5 would not only result
131. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(a), (b) (1956). Other factors considered by the
Treasury are: (1) Whether there was a business purpose for the allocation,
(2) whether related items from the same source are so allocated, (3) the
duration of the allocation, (4) the overall tax consequences of the allocation, (5) whether normal business factors were recognized, and (6) whether
the amount of the allocation was at the time subject to reasonable estimation.
132. Economic effect could be ensured, for example, by treating deductible items
for accounting-as distinguished from tax-purposes as capital expenditures. If the allocated deductions do not reduce the capital accounts of the
investor-partners, the economic effect is to increase the "preference" of such
partners on dissolution. From the viewpoint of the account, however, the
deduction would have only tax consequences and hence might be vulnerable.
Id. § 1.704-1(b) (2).
133. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 704 (d). Losses in excess of the basis of the
partner's interest, however, may be carried forward and utilized in the
first subsequent year in which the partner has a basis exceeding zero.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (d) (1) (1956).
134. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 705(a) (2) (B).
135. Treas. Reg. §1.61-2(d) (4) (1957) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b) (1) (1955).
A transfer by the sponsor of properties owned by him in exchange for
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in taxable income, but might also yield liability for stock
Conwatering'86 or for issuing stock for future services.'
ceivably the latter problems could be avoided if no-par or
low par value stock were issued and the sponsor paid nominal
cash amounts at least equal to par. Presumably, however, the
IRS would look at the substance of the transaction and
conclude that the stock was issued for future services. A
preferable alternative would be to form a limited partnership
consisting of the sponsor as a general partner and the investors, organized into a separate Subchapter S corporation, as
the limited partner. Under this arrangement not only would
the corporate status of the sponsor not affect the Subchapter
S election of the investors, but also, by limiting the sponsor
to an interest in partnership profits and its own capital
account as outlined above, the receipt of such interest should
not constitute taxable income. It might be argued in this
context that all of the income of the Subchapter S corporation
is of the disqualifying, passive type ;.38 but this conclusion

would necessitate disregarding the existence of the partnership13 and thereby stretch the substance-over-form argument
to the limit.14 If the sponsor is to be the general partner, it
may be important for it to have substantial assets in addition
to its interest in the partnership, since an inability to show
financial independence may support the conclusion that the
entity has achieved limited liability and is, therefore, an
association taxable as a corporation.'41
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT

While, as previously noted, exploration funds share common characteristics with mutual funds and some in fact

136.
137.
138.

139.

140.
141.

stock might be non-taxable, if he and the other organizers owned 80% or
more of the stock upon the conclusion of the transaction. INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 351, 368(c).
See H. HENN, CORPORATIONS 247-57 (1961).
Id. at 247.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e) (5) provides that the election under Subchapter S shall terminate for any taxable year in which the corporation has
more than $3,000 in passive investment income, and such income exceeds
20% of its gross receipts. Passive investment income is defined as that
realized from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and gains from
sales or exchanges of stock or securities.
If the partnership itself were classified as an association, see text accompanying notes 77-80 sup'a, amounts received by the Subehapter S corporation from the partnership would be dividends and, thus, clearly passive
income.
Leasehold interests held by the fund may be classified as investment contracts and hence securities. See text accompanying note 145 infra.
See note 79 supra.
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attempt to give the appearance of being a counterpart of a
mutual fund, they are, nevertheless, not investment companies
as that term is defined by the Investment Company Act of
1940.142 Yet, only one of the seven prospectuses examined
specifically stated that the fund was not an investment
company.
Any doubt concerning the status of exploration funds
under the Investment Company Act is eliminated by section
3(c) (11), which specifically excludes from the definiiton of
an investment company any corporation substantially all of
whose business involves holding oil, gas, or other mineral
royalties or leases.1 4 The Commission, however, has proposed
an amendment to section 3(c) (11) which would confine this
exclusion to such companies only if they are "not engaged
in the business of issuing redeemable securities, face-amount
certificates of the installation type or periodic plan certificates . . . . "'44 Significantly, two of the seven exploration
funds examined issued redeemable securities and what appear
to be periodic plan certificates. Moreover, since all of the
remaining funds either provide for commitments payable as
called or at specified intervals, it is conceivable that some of
these funds might be deemed to have issued periodic plan
certificates. Such issues, however, do not appear to be an
essential ingredient to an exploration fund operation and
could be readily modified in order to avoid classification as
an investment company under the Act. Those funds not within the exclusion must be engaged "in the business of investing,
reinvesting, or trading in securities" to be classified as an
investment company under the Commission's proposed amendment to section 3(c) (11).'
Thus, it becomes necessary to
determine whether such funds are investing in securities. To
the extent they acquire fractional undivided interests in oil
and gas leases, as distinguished from entire leases, they are
142. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1964).
143. Id. § 80a-3(c) (11).
144. The Commission's proposal to amend § 3(c) (11) is incorporated in S. 1659,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (5) (1967).
145. Id. Section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act defines an investment
company as an issuer which "holds itself out as being engaged primarily .. .
in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities . . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 80a-3(1) (1964). Section 3(c) (11) presently excludes from this
definition "[a]ny person substantially all of whose business consists of
owning or holding oil, gas, or other mineral royalties or leases . . . ."
including fractional interests and/or investment contracts. Id. § 80a3 (c) (11).
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clearly so doing. Securities trading could be found in connection with farm-outs and also, perhaps, in those instances
retains or otherwise receives a
where the sponsor-manager
146
carried interest.
If, however, the fund acquired only entire leaseholds, it
would be necessary to classify such interests as investment
contracts in order to regard them as securities. The SEC
might take the position that regardless of the form of the
exploration fund, such an arrangement should be viewed as
constituting an "entity," even though not a conventional one.
The Commission could then argue that, while in form the
fund purports to invest in oil and gas properties and to
conduct an oil and gas exploration business, the fund itself
is only nominally acquiring properties and has no real control
over the development of the properties. Rather, the argument
would continue, the fund actually acquired a series of investment contracts, each of which consists of an oil and gas lease
with a management contract (operating agreement), under
which the manager will cause wells to be drilled. To buttress
this position, reliance would be placed on SEC v. C. M. Joiner
4 7 which involved the sale of oil and gas
Leasing Corporation,'
leases with a representation relating to the drilling of a well,
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Company, 4 ' which considered the
sale of specifically described citrus groves with a management contract. Viewed in the context of these precedents, the
business of the fund consists of dealing in investment contracts, which are securities, rather than actually operating
mineral properties. Such a conclusion requires a two-step
analysis: (1) The investor in an exploration fund acquires an
investment contract or interest in a profit-sharing agreement,
and (2) the fund in turn is engaged in the business of acquiring investment contracts relating to oil and gas development.
The foregoing problem remains academic, however, unless
and until section 3(c) (11) of the Investment Company Act
is amended as proposed.
146. Section 2(a) (35) of the Investment Company Act defines a security to
include "investment contracts" and "fractional undivided interest[s] in oil,
gas or other mineral rights." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (35) (1964). For a
discussion of the possible classification of oil and gas interests as securities
see generally H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIEs LAW 58-72 (1966).

147. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
148. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss1/1

44

Bloomenthal: Mineral Exploration Funds

1969

MINERAL EXPLORATION FUNDS

If some exploration funds were legislatively classified
as investment companies, significant changes would be required in the format and practices of such funds. Registration under the Investment Company Act 49 would, of course,
be necessary, and the funds would be subject to the more
stringent reporting requirements of that Act.1"' In addition,
a whole panoply of regulations would come into play, the
most important being the requirement that all transactions,
property transfers, etc. between affiliates and the funds
would have to be submitted to the Commission for a deterruination, after notice and hearing, that the terms were reasonable and fair. 1 ' Moreover, if pending legislation relating to
investment companies were adopted, sales charges would be
regulated and management fees and compensation would be
scrutinized. 15 2 It is probable, however, that the exploration
funds affected would discontinue the issuance of redeemable
securities or periodic plan certificates, in which event they
would remain within the section 3(c) (11) exclusion even
if it were amended as proposed.
SECURITIES ACT-WHAT

Is

THE SECURITY

.

When a limited partnership is utilized to form an explor5 3
ation fund, the limited partnership interest is a security."
In many instances, however, the limited partnership is not
in being at the time of the offering, and hence merely preorganization subscriptions in a limited partnership are
offered." 4 Where co-ownership interests are offered, it is
149. Investment Company Act §§ 7-8, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-7 to -8 (1964).
150. In addition to filing with the Commission prescribed annual and periodic
reports and statements of share ownership, a registered investment company
must transmit semi-annual reports to its shareholders. Investment Company
Act § 30, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (1964) ; 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.30a-1 to .30f-1 (1967).
151. Investment Company Act § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1964).
152. See S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 8(d), 12(c) (1) (1967).
153. Section 2 (1) of the Securities Act defines a security to include a "certificate
of interest . . . in any profit-sharing agreement .

. ."

15 U.S.C. § 77b(l)

(1964). Some commentators would find no security if there were only a
few limited partners and no substitution of partners without consent of
the others. See L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 504-05 (1961).
For a
discussion of partnership interests as securities see generally H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 146, at 78-81.
154. "Pre-organization subscriptions" are within the Securities Act definition of
a security. Securities Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964). It does not
appear to be feasible to organize the partnership in advance of an offering,
since § 2 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act requires the filing of a
certificate which includes the names and the capital contributions of each
of the limited general partners and since § 8 requires the filing of an
amendment to the certificate before additional limited partners may be
admitted. Two of the funds examined included provisions in the preorganization subscriptions which gave a designated person a power of
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conceivable that the security consists of the fractional undivided interests in mineral rights. 5 Nevertheless, since no
specific mineral rights exist at the time of the offering, it is
more likely that what is offered would be viewed as an investment contract-the investment of money with the expectation
of a return as a result of the efforts of the sponsor'-or as
a profit-sharing agreement.
A related problem is isolating the consideration exchanged for the security. The issue is most apparent with
respect to the sale of fractional undivided interests in oil and
gas rights. The decisions in this area have varied significantly, with one state court concluding that only the consideration given for the fractional undivided interest, as
distinguished from the cost of drilling the well, was the
consideration for the security, 15 T and a federal tribunal holding that the amounts paid for drilling the initial well, the
completion costs, and the cost of drilling additional wells
were all part of the consideration." 8 Although the former
holding is not likely to be followed since it overlooks the
investment contract concept, it does not necessarily follow
that completion costs and the cost of drilling additional wells
will be regarded as part of the "purchase price." A comparable problem of isolating consideration exists with regard
to exploratory funds, since, as noted, the original investment
often does not cover completion costs or the cost of drilling
additional wells. The resolution of the consideration issue
is important, because purchase price determines, among other
things, the dollar amount of securities to be registered and
the measure of recovery in a civil action for damages or
rescission arising out of the sale of such securities. While it
is impossible to make a definite determination from the

155.
156.
157.
158.

attorney to execute the certificate of partnership on behalf of the investors.
A third fund, which used a dummy limited partner to organize initially,
presumably would file an amended certificate after the partnership interests
were sold, for each investor designated the sponsor as his attorney with
authority to execute the amended certificate. Under § 25 of the ULPA the
amendment to the certificate is to be signed and sworn to by all of the
limited partners including those to be added after organization.
Fractional undivided interests in mineral rights are specifically within the
statutory definition of a security. Securities Act § 2 (1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1)
(1964).
See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
Hammer v. Sanders, 8 Ill. 2d 414, 134 N.E.2d 509, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878
(1956).
Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1955). See generally H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 146, at 59-67.
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prospectuses examined, they appear to have assumed, with
the apparent acquiescence of the SEC staff, that only the
specific payments provided for-and not "assessments "constituted the consideration for the security. Interestingly,
in the somewhat analogous situation of assessable securities,
the Commission takes the position that each assessment involves a sale and that the additional charges constitute part
of the purchase price of the security.t5 9
Assuming that all monies payable under a particular
fund arrangement, including completion costs and cost of
drilling development wells, are part of the sale price, an
important question is whether there is a continuing offer of
the security until these monies are called for and paid. If a
continuing offer is found, the fund must, among other things,
revise its prospectus and furnish the participants with the
revision. Since in most of the arrangements examined the
investor is committed from the time of his initial participation to pay his proportionate share of the completion costs,
it would appear that no new investment decision is involvedunless a decision to breach one's contractual obligation can
be viewed as an investment decision. Thus, there would presumably be no continuing offer. However, there is generally
no obligation to contribute monies to drill additional development wells, although failure to contribute may result in either
forfeiture of a portion of the acreage or other penalties.
Nevertheless, in another context, the existence of a continuing
offer has been held to depend upon whether the investor is
making a new investment decision. 6 ' Of course, if the SEC
concludes that additional contributions to an exploration fund
are not part of the sale price of the security, the issue of
whether there was a continuing offer would not be reached.
In those funds in which investors have the right to elect not
to participate in particular projects, the possibility of an
enduring offer is again raised. Because there is still an element of volition involved, it might be argued that a currently
valid prospectus must be delivered at the time of the election.
Moreover, one of the funds provided for annual commitments
which could, after the end of the year, be avoided by the
159. Securities Act Rule 136, 17 C.F.R. § 230.136 (1967).
160. SEC v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 1957-1961 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
1 90,861 (D. Colo. 1958).
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investor if he had participated in the program for three
calendar quarters. This structure raises the distinct possibility that any offer made after the investor could elect to
terminate is a continuing or new one.
The prospectuses of the funds examined seemed to
assume, with apparent SEC approval, that there was no continuing offer problem in the situations described above. The
SEC's acquiescence in this assumption may reflect a pragmatic approach, since the funds might be tempted to eliminate
whatever volition investors do have and bind them to extensive
future commitments. Yet, SEC disapproval of the assumption
would promote more informed investor decisions, for the
funds would be compelled to furnish all details relating to
specific properties, a disclosure they currently can avoid by
assuming that there is no continuing offer. While some of
the funds giving investors an election to participate in particular projects purported to furnish appropriate information
upon which a decision could be based, the content of these
disclosures is not scrutinized by the SEC staff for accuracy
or adequacy as would be the case if a revised prospectus were
required.
Since exploration funds are relatively new on the securities scene, there do not appear to be any decisions that involve
the precise questions raised above. Accordingly, it may be
advisable to obtain SEC staff rulings when such issues arise.
SECURITIES ACT-WHO Is

THE ISSUER?

Identifying the issuer of securities offered by exploration
funds is important for a number of purposes under the Securities Act of 1933. For example, an issuer must file and sign
the registration statement' and is subject to the liabilities
imposed by section 11 of the Act for false or misleading statements in the registration statement.'62 Further, resolution of
the question determines in part the content of the registration
161. The registration statement must be signed and filed by the issuer. Securities
Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1964).
162. Section 11 presents a comprehensive scheme of liability directed against the
"issuer" and other designated persons. The issuer, however, cannot avail
itself of any of the enumerated defenses which are available to other
defendants. Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
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6 3 With respect to a limited partnership existing
statement."
at the time of the offering, it would appear that the partnership is the issuer.'6 4 However, in view of the often nominal
nature of these partnerships, it would not be unreasonable to
treat the sponsor as the issuer, at least for disclosure purposes.165 In the other arrangements commonly used for
exploration funds, the sponsor is and has been regarded as
the issuer, although it is possible that the fund itself could
be viewed as an entity and as such the "issuer."' 6 6 While the
foregoing discussion has assumed throughout that the sponsor
is a single entity, in most of the funds examined the sponsor
consisted of more than one entity. Frequently a subsidiary or
affiliate of a large company had been organized for the specific purposes of offering the interests involved and acting as
issuer, while the larger company acted as manager and derived
the management compensation. The subsidiary or affiliate
company was frequently newly organized, with neither a
significant prior operating history nor very substantial assets.
Thus, the financial statements required of the issuer were
easily prepared and not very revealing. Among the funds
studied, one issuer had total assets of $87,000, although its
parent, for which financial statements were not included, was
a more substantial company; three reported assets of $10,000,
$12,500, and $1,000 respectively, with no disclosure regarding
their parents; and finally, two issuers had assets of $250,000
cash, but apparently at one time followed the practice of
lending all their cash back to their parent. The partnership
fund examined included no financial statements, apparently
163. Schedule A to the Securities Act, which enumerates information to be
included in the prospectus and registration statement and the additional
data called for by the appropriate form (S-1 through S-14), pertains, for
the most part, to the "issuer." 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1964).
164. Section 2(4) of the Securities Act defines the term "issuer" to mean every
person-a term which includes a partnership under § 2(2)-who issues or
proposes to issue any security. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1964).
165. The Commission has broad authority under § 7 of the Securities Act to
require by rules and regulations that the registration statement include
such other information as the Commission may consider necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 15 U.S.C.
166.

§ 77g (1964).
The Securities Act definition of "issuer," see note 164 supra, is adequate

for securities issued by a conventional entity such as a corporation or
partnership. However, some of the unique arrangements employed by
exploration funds, not involving any formal-type entity which issues a
security granting the holder rights in the organization, poses some conceptual problems not anticipated by the Act. While it may be convenient for
Securities Act purposes to regard the sponsor as the "issuer" since it
"issues" the security, such a construction would completely frustrate the
registration objectives of the Exchange Act, see text accompanying notes
175-87 infra, with respect to such securities.
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treating the partnership, which had but $100 in assets, as the
issuer. It is also interesting to note that, to the extent financial statements were included, only a balance sheet was
required. 6 '
The use of a specially created affiliate as an "issuer"
probably does not affect the parent's liability under section
11 in view of the provisions of section 15 imposing comparable
liability on persons controlling the issuer."' However, such
use does affect the nature of the disclosures, for prospective
investors are deprived of relevant financial information concerning the actual sponsor.
REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

The necessity for registration under the Securities Act
will ordinarily depend upon the availability of an exemption,
particularly the one for private offerings." 9 For the private
offering exemption to be available, the offer must be made
to a predetermined group of investors having available information comparable to that which would be included in a registration statement.'7 0 If, as is usually the case, such an offering
is made to persons other than institutional investors, a serious
question frequently arises as to whether such investors are
sufficiently "sophisticated" and have adequate information
available to them to satisfy the foregoing criteria. The fact
that the investors are high-bracket taxpayers does not per se
establish such sophistication,' 7 ' although investors in this
category who employ their own geologists and other experts
to assist them in their investment program would conceivably
meet the necessary qualifications. Yet, in view of the fact
that a single offer to a non-sophisticated investor will destroy
167. The financial disclosure required of an exploration fund parallels the practice followed with respect to mutual fund proxy solicitations, for there the
balance sheet of the management company, though not an "issuer" for the
purpose of such solicitation, must be included. 17 C.F.R. 270.20a-2(a) (9)
(1967). Apparently, requiring only a balance sheet represents a compromise
which recognizes that some financial information is desirable, but which
allows something less than the usually required disclosure.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1964).
169. Securities Act § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964). An issuer confining its
offering exclusively to bona fide residents of the state in which it is incorporated and doing business--or resides, if not a corporation-may be able
to utilize the intrastate exemption provided by § 3(a) (11) of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11) (1964).
170. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC Securities Act Release
No. 4552, 1967 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2770 (Nov. 6, 1962).
171. But cf. Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D. Colo. 1959).
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the exemption as to all the investors,' 7 2 it may be advisable to
register the securities, even though the actual participants
are few in number.
If an exploration fund having 300 or more participants
is registered under the Securities Act, it will be subject to the
periodic (Form 8-K) and annual (Form 10-K) reporing
requirements. 7 ' Even if a fund has less than 300 participants,
it must file such reports for the fiscal year in which its registration statement becomes effective.1 7 ' Since Form 8-K, a
monthly report filed for the month in which any of the events
specified in the form occur, calls for information relating to
the acquisition of a significant amount of assets otherwise
than in the ordinary course of business, it could be an important source of information concerning properties actually
acquired by a fund. However, there will always be the question of what constitutes "ordinary course of business" for this
purpose. Further, only limited information need be furnished,
including a brief description of the asset, the consideration
paid for it and the persons from whom it was acquired. While
for registrants with less than 300 participants such reports
are required only during a limited period of time, in many
instances this would be a critical period since most exploratory funds have one-year programs. The most glaring shortcoming of the present reporting system, however, is the fact
that, although these reports are filed with the SEC and
subject to routine scrutiny by the staff, the reports are not
disseminated to the participants nor made available to them
unless the participants themselves take the initiative in
examining the reports or obtaining copies of them from the
Commission.
An exploration fund may also be subject to the registration requirements of the Exchange Act, which is applicable to
any class of equity securities held of record by 500 or more
security holders, if the issuer has total assets exceeding
$1,000,000.'
Rules adopted by the Commission specifically
define a limited partnership interest as an equity security
for the purpose of registration, and these rules are probably
172.
173.
174.
175.

See id.
Securities Exchange Act §§ 13, 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1964).
Id. § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1964).
Id. § 12(g) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1) (1964).
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broad enough to encompass the securities issued by other
types of exploration funds. " 6 Although the Exchange Act
definition of "issuer""' is substantially identical to the
Securities Act definition, 7 8 it seems imperative, if the registration provisions of the Exchange Act are to be given effect
in this context, to regard the fund "entity," whatever it may

be, as the issuer for the purpose of determining whether the
$1,000,000 asset requirement has been met. " 9 Although the
sponsor may be regarded as the issuer for Securities Act
purposes, the sponsor's financial status seems a less appro-

priate subject of continued disclosure than that of the fund
itself.

°

Where securities have already been registered under the
Securities Act, Exchange Act registration can be accomplished
with relative ease and will not add appreciably to the quality
It is conceivable, but unlikely,
of information available.'
that Exchange Act registration might be compelled of exploration funds not registered under the Securities Act, since some
funds may have offered securities in violation of the registration provisions of the Securities Act or pursuant to the intraIn any event, Exchange Act
state offering exemption.'
registration will necessitate the filing of current and annual
reports with the Commission, a requirement to which a fund
will already be subject if it has registered an offer under
In addition, registration under the
the Securities Act.'
Exchange Act will bring into play the short-swing profit
although the opportunities for
provisions of that Act,'
Exchange Act Rule 3a11-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (1967).
Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(8) (1964).
See note 164 supra.
See note 166 supra.
As noted previously, the sponsor which offers interests in exploration funds
is often deliberately created with token assets and is typically affiliated with
and under the control of a larger company. See text accompanying notes
166-68 supra. Such sponsor-offerers generally have only a few shareholders
although the "fund" itself may have a large number of participants.
181. Securities registered under the Securities Act may register under the
Exchange Act by use of the greatly simplified Form 8-A. 17 C.F.R.
§ 249.208a (1967).
182. It is not likely that a fund would have 500 participants and yet not be
subject to registration under the Securities Act. However, if the original
participants divided their interests to the extent that there are now more
than 500 holders, previous registration may have been avoided. In such
event, or if the securities were originally offered in violation of the 1933
Act registration provisions, a fund may be caught within the Exchange Act
registration requirement.
183. Securities Exchange Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964). For a discussion of
the reporting procedures see text accompanying note 173 supra.
184. Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
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"insiders" to trade in the type of security involved ordinarily
are very limited. Perhaps the most significant impact of
Exchange Act registration would be the application of the
proxy rules to the infrequent situations in which exploration
funds are required to obtain authorizations or consents from
their participants.1 8 Funds that give their investors a right
to elect whether to participate in particular projects would
presumably be subject to the proxy solicitation rules. It is
also conceivable that requests to participate in the drilling of
development wells would be viewed as a solicitation of consent." In both of these instances the proxy rules could fill
an existing gap by compelling the disclosure of relevant
information." 7
SOME DISCLOSURE PROBLEMS

As one would expect, all of the prospectuses examined
referred to the speculative nature of the offerings. The following is a typical statement: "Exploration for oil and gas
is highly speculative and its results cannot be forecast. Therefore, investors should not consider making any investments
of funds other than portions of investors' income which is
recurring and is normally subject to Federal Income Tax at
high rates." Another prospectus suggested that it would be
inappropriate to invest one's capital-as distinguished from
recurring income--in the drilling of exploratory wells, but
that it might be acceptable to invest capital in completion
costs. While all of the funds appealed to the high-bracket
taxpayer, one fund in its supplemental sales literature had
an illustration designed to show that an investor need not be
in an upper bracket to realize tax savings from oil and gas
investments. Perhaps the most effective means of keeping
out the small investor, however, are the high minimum financial commitments required of participants. Yet, one of the
funds had a minimum commitment of only $1,500 and permitted a $1,300 subscription on a monthly participation plan
of three monthly down payments of $150 and periodic payments of $50 for the balance. The fund purported, however,
185.

Securities Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964) ; Exchange Act Rules
14a-1(d), 14a-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1(d), 240.14a-2 (1967).
186. Cf. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
187. There was a paucity of information furnished with respect to the properties
to be developed. See text accompanying note 189 infra.
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to limit its activities to proven and semi-proven properties,
which should make its operation somewhat less speculative.
Significantly, a subsequent program, brought out by an
affiliate of the sponsor of this fund, related to a wildcat
program and required a minimum of $5,000 or a monthly
participation plan of $6,600 with $3,000 down and 24 monthly
payments of $150 each.
Disclosures concerning -potential conflicts of interest
were included in the prospectuses of the funds studied
although with varying degrees of emphasis. Statements were
typically made concerning the experience, or lack thereof, of
management1 88 in carrying on oil and gas exploration activities, the interest of management in transactions undertaken
or to be undertaken between it and the fund, and management's compensation. Moreover, as previously noted, financial
information in the form of a balance sheet relating to the
sponsor was generally included. Since the funds studied had
no specific mineral interests at the time of the offerings, the
only disclosure relating to properties pertained to the general
geographical areas in which the funds planned acquisitions
and the classification of these properties in terms of wildcat,
semi-proven, or proven properties.18 9 The manner in which
proceeds were to be used was generally shown in terms of a
percentage allocation rather than an estimate of the number
of dollars to be spent. The breakdown in this regard is significant, since it determines the extent to which participants will
be able to currently deduct their investment. 9 ° Of the seven
funds examined, two included no breakdown at all, one showed
acquisition costs (capitalized and recoverable through depletion) of an unrealistic one percent, two showed acquisition
costs of twenty percent and one of thirty percent. Expenditures on intangibles were estimated at sixty percent in two
funds and seventy percent in two others. Two of the funds
188. Some of the funds examined appear to have made successful efforts to
obtain prestigious persons as officers or directors of the sponsor, including
in one instance a former counsel to the President of the United States.
189. The fact that the funds do not own mineral properties at the time of the
offering greatly simplifies the disclosure problem and avoids the necessity
of making disclosures, for example, that the company's properties have "only
a very remote possibility of obtaining profitable production." Such a disclosure was made by a fund organized in 1962, which chose to include a
specific property in its "portfolio" prior to offering securities to the public.
It is a safe assumption that this disclosure was required by the staff, and
was perhaps warranted by the particular property.
190. See text accompanying notes 99-141 supra.
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did not break down expenditures between drilling costs, which
are generally deductible, and completion costs, which are
generally capitalized and recovered through depreciation, but
showed the combined costs of fifty-five percent in one instance
and ninety percent in the other. One fund had yet another
breakdown, estimating equipment costs of twenty-five percent
and lumping deductible drilling costs with certain nondeductible costs exclusive of equipment in a forty-five percent
estimate. Obviously, improvements could be made in such
divulgements by requiring the typical SEC disclosure in terms
of priority of the use of funds with separate estimates of the
amount deductible for tax purposes, the amount to be capitalized and recovered through the depletion deduction, and
the amount to be capitalized and recovered through the
depreciation deduction.
Since all of the offerings studied were on a best-efforts
basis, they utilized the usual disclosure that no assurance was
given that any part of the proceeds would be realized and that,
in the case of inadequate response to the offering, no part of
the proceeds would be returned to investors. However, all of
the funds provided that unless a specified minimum were committed by participants prior to a specified date, all monies
would be returned without deductions.'' While the Commission has no power to require return of proceeds in case of
insufficient response, it is reasonable to assume that the staff
"encourages" this approach.
The type of information included relating to tax aspects
of investments in exploration funds has been discussed previously.19 At least two of the funds also used a table designed
to show, for a taxpayer in the highest bracket (seventy percent), the tax consequences both of proposed expenditures and
of varying hypothetical net cash receipts realized from each
dollar of such gross expenditures. Thus, one table assumed
an expenditure of $100,000 for a participant and net cash
receipts per dollar spent of none, fifty cents, one dollar, and
a dollar and a half. On this basis the table showed a federal
income tax credit of seventy percent of $100,000, or a net
191.

In some instances only very short periods of time were provided for return
of investments. For example, one fund agreed to return all amounts received
if it did not raise $500,000 within 35 days.
192. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
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out-of-pocket cost to the taxpayer of $30,000, which one can
conclude would be the taxpayer's actual cost if no production
were obtained. If production were obtained and income equivalent to fifty cents per dollar spent were realized, the taxpayer's net out-of-pocket cost would be $5,285. If one dollar
were returned for every dollar spent, the table indicated a net
return, after taxes and after giving effect to all deductions, of
$19,425 in excess of $30,000 out-of-pocket costs to the taxpayer
who invested $100,000, even though the enterprise merely
returned the amount invested. If a dollar and a half in net
cash were realized for every one dollar invested, the taxpayer
would receive a net return of $44,140 in excess of his out-ofpocket costs.
While this table is carefully qualified, it requires a fair
degree of tax sophistication to fully understand it. The net
out-of-pocket cost on a $100,000 investment for a seventy
percent bracket taxpayer is shown as $30,000 even if the well
is productive. This would be true only if over a period of
years-perhaps as many as twenty, depending upon the life
of the oil deposit-all expenditures are deducted either as
intangibles, depletion or depreciation. The table also assumed
that the fifty percent of net income limitation under section
613 will not reduce statutory depletion as is possible, particularly in the year in which wells are drilled. 9 ' Moreover, the
table assumed, though without explicitly so stating, that a
relatively small percentage of the initial investment would
be spent for acquisition. If, for example, thirty percent of the
initial funds went into acquisition costs, the excess for the
most favorable return of a dollar and a half for every dollar
expended would have been approximately $16,000 rather than
the $44,000 i94 indicated in the table; and at a dollar return per
193. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. Assuming intangibles are
deducted, the effect is to reduce net income in the year a well is drilled, and,
as to that particular property, possibly to reduce the amount of statutory
depletion that could otherwise have been taken. For tax planning suggestions in this regard see generally Bloomenthal, A Guide to FederalMineral
Income Taxation (pt. 1), 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 77, 107-11 (1966).
194.
Assuming 30%
FiguresShown
Spent on Acquiin Prospectus
sition Costs
$100,000
$100,000
1. Gross Expenditures
70,000
70,000
2. Tax Credits at 70%
$ 30,000
$ 30,000
3. Out-of-Pocket Costs
166,500
166,500
4. Participant's Gross Income
From Sale of Oil

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss1/1

56

Bloomenthal: Mineral Exploration Funds

1969

57

MINERAL EXPLORATION FUNDS

dollar spent, there would have been no excess, rather than the
$19,425 shown.195 On the other hand, the most favorable return
assumed in the table does not represent the upper limit of
return in cases where oil is actually found.
The sponsor or an affiliate of the sponsor of five funds
had organized exploration funds in the past, and the prospectuses of three of these funds included a record of the past
performance of these prior programs. While two funds had
no prior exploration fund experience, of the three funds
reflecting previous experience, one ran back to 1952 and one
had engaged in three and the other in two earlier programs.
Rather detailed information was set forth in the prospectuses
of these funds concerning the prior programs which they had
conducted, including expenditures made, drilling results, pro5. Less Operating Costs and
Ad Valorem Taxes (Assumed
to be 10%)
6. Cash Income Before Taxes
7. Statutory Depletion in Excess
of Acquisition Costs
8. Taxable Income
9. Federal Income Tax at 70%
10. Net Cash after Taxes
(7+8-9)
11. Less Out-of-Pocket Costs as
Shown in 3
12. Excess (or Deficiency) of
Available Cash Over Out-of
Pocket Costs

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Gross Expenditures
Tax Credits at 70%
Out-of-Pocket Costs
Participant's Gross Income
From Sale of Oil
Less Operating Costs and
Ad Valorem Taxes (Assumed
to be 10%)
Cash Income Before Taxes
Statutory Depletion in Excess
of Acquisition Costs
Taxable Income
Federal Income Tax at 70%
Net Cash after Taxes
(7+8-9)
Less Out-of-Pocket Costs as
Shown in 3
Excess (or Deficiency) of
Available Cash Over Out-of
Pocket Costs

16,500

16,500

150,000
41,625

150,000
15,785

108,375
75,860
74,140

134,215
93,950
56,050

30,000

30,000

$ 44,000

$ 16,050

FiguresShown
in Prospectus

Assuming 30%
Spent in Acquisition Costs
$100,000
70,000
$ 30,000
$111,000

$100,000
70,000
$ 30,000
$111,000
11,000

11,000

$100,000
27,750

$100,000
none

$ 72,250
50,575
49,425

$100,000
70,000
30,000

80,000

30,000

$ 19,425
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duction history, and income derived from each of the operations. One fund pointed out that, because of prorationing, the
amount of production shown did not reflect the maximum
capacity of its wells.' Three of the programs revealed by one
fund showed, as of 1967, gross income in excess of gross
expenditures. As to the other funds, none of the past programs had returned the monies invested in them. The sponsor
with a fund history going back to 1952 had spent an aggregate
of $107 million in all of its programs and had yielded gross
income to participants of approximately $57 million. This
fund published, though not as part of its prospectus, an estimate of reserves which suggested that its prior programs
would overall return from approximately two dollars and a
half to a dollar and seventy-five cents for every dollar invested, depending upon which reserves are used-those calculated by the company or those prepared by two independent
petroleum engineers.'97 In the subjective judgment of the
author, of those examined this fund appears to be the best
managed in terms of the personnel employed and the full-time
nature of the efforts devoted to the fund. Reserve figures
are apparently not available with respect to all prior programs of this fund. Moreover, the history of one earlier
program is difficult to evaluate because it involved secondary
recovery operations,' and there do not appear to be any
accepted engineering standards for evaluating or predicting
the success of such undertakings.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Potential conflicts of interest seem to abound with respect
to exploration funds and, in fact, appear almost inevitable,
since in most cases the sponsor devotes only part of its time
to the exploration fund and independently engages in the
oil and gas business. Conflicts, however, may exist not only
To keep production in line with demand, several states impose restrictions
on the amount of oil that may be produced from particular wells or fields.
E.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6014 (1962). Often this regulation
takes the form of, or has the effect of, limiting the number of days a
producing well may be utilized during a month. Thus, one of the funds
reported that the average monthly producing days allowed for its oil wells
in Texas for 1966 had been 10.28 days compared with 8.68 days for 1965.
197. The fund estimated total net income of $267 million for its proved reserves,
whereas two independent engineers employed by the fund for this purpose
estimated $197 million and $186 million respectively as the total net income
to be derived from proved reserves.
198. For a description of secondary recovery operations see note 4 supra.
196.
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between the fund and the sponsor, but between the various
funds organized by the same sponsor as well. The potentiality
for conflict is particularly acute in the following situations:
(1) determination of the price at which the sponsor sells
properties or other services to the fund; (2) decisions concerning whether properties are to be acquired for the fund
or the sponsor or an affiliate of the sponsor; (3) decisions
by the sponsor concerning which properties he is to assign
to the fund, thus permitting the assignment of the less desirable properties; (4) discovery of information in connection
with the fund's activities which would benefit the sponsor.
Some of these conflicts can be minimized, if not substantially precluded. For example, conflicts as to pricing of
properties can be avoided by providing, as many of the funds
do, for acquisition at cost.19 The possibility for other conflicts could also be eliminated by providing, as one fund to
a large extent and some of the other funds to a lesser extent
have done, that acquisitions for the fund are to be limited to
areas different from those in which the sponsor will carry
on its own exploration activities. Yet, even when this approach
is adopted, conflicts could still exist between two funds managed by the same sponsor. One sponsor attempted to prevent
this type of conflict by organizing one fund to engage in
wildcat activities and limiting the other fund to the acquisition of proven or semi-proven properties. Another fund
reduced opportunities for conflict by requiring the officers
and employees of the sponsor to refrain from engaging in oil
and gas activities and precluding acquisitions from persons
affiliated with the sponsor."'
199. One of the funds examined disclosed that an affiliate of the sponsor would
sell the fund leases and other properties at "rates comparable to those paid
by others in the oil and gas industry." Yet, while oil and gas leases are
widely sold, each lease to a degree is unique and market prices are seldom
established. Another fund provided that an affiliate of a sponsor could
sell the fund leases acquired by the affiliate prior to the organization of the
fund for cost (including allocated overhead) plus 10%. However, this fund
represented that no specific properties had been selected for resale. The
same fund provided that properties acquired and transferred by the affiliate
subsequent to the organization of the fund would be transferred at cost.
200. Another of the funds examined represented that, although an affiliate of
the sponsor would continue to acquire properties for its own account as well
as for the fund, all properties acquired would first be offered to the fund.
Yet, because the affiliate and the fund were commonly controlled, the same
people would be determining which properties were retained and which
would be selected for the fund. In this particular fund, however, the sponsors were also substantial investors.
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In two of the funds examined, the sponsor was a substantial investor in the fund, a factor tending to reduce any
motivation to take advantage of the fund. Moreover, in all
of the funds studied, the sponsor was dependent upon the
success of the fund, if it were to realize substantial benefits
for itself. However, in none of the funds were all potential
conflicts eliminated, and disclosures relating to such conflicts

were somewhat spotty.
With respect to those funds organized as limited partnerships, it would appear clear that the sponsor as general
01
partner has fiduciary obligations to the limited partners."
Similarly, it is very likely that fiduciary concepts will be
extended to the other forms of fund organizations.2 02 Several
of the prospectuses examined, for example, represented that
the sponsor was a fiduciary, although at the same time
attempts were made to limit the sponsor's liability for mismanagement to either willful or gross misconduct or a failure
to exercise a good faith judgment." 3 However, as others have
noted, classification as a fiduciary is only the beginning of
analysis,'" and one must seek solutions somewhere between
the "punctillio of honor" 5' and the fact that participants
201. Singletary v. Mann, 157 Fla. 37, 24 So. 2d 718 (1946).
202. In a case in which a co-tenancy arrangement was characterized as a mining
partnership, the court said: "[T]hose having the majority interest control
its management . . . rendering themselves personally accountable, in an
accounting between the partners, for any culpable negligence, or breach of
duty, or wrongful conduct, or diversion of the property from the firm's
business to other business in which such managing partner may be interested . . . ." Bartlett & Stancliff v. Boyles, 66 W.Va. 327, 330, 66 S.E. 474,
475 (1909); accord, Stephens v. Allen, 314 Ky. 769, 237 S.W.2d 72 (1951).
Other cases have held, without characterizing the arrangement as a mining
partnership, that the operator under a typical operating agreement is a
fiduciary. E.g., Beadle v. Daniels, 362 P.2d 128 (Wyo. 1961) ; Midcon Oil &
Gas Ltd. v. New British Dominion Oil Co., 21 W.W.R. (n.s.) 228 (App. Div.
1957). The Midcon Oil & Gas case relied on a "joint-adventurer' 'and "principal-agency" characterization of the relationship created. It should be
noted that many of the funds examined which utilized co-ownership arrangements disclaimed the existence of any partnership, but often characterized
themselves as a "joint-venture."
203. For a discussion relating to the liability of a sponsor for negligence see text
accompanying notes 220-21 infra.
204. "But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction
to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligation does he
owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?" SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.).
205. "Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible
in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those
bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctillio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).
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are generally reasonably sophisticated and, in some instances
at least, consent to the overall arrangement after full disclosure of the potential conflicts. Extension of the Investment
Company Act and other regulatory phases of the securities
laws"' could close some of these gaps, but perhaps at a price
that would make it no longer feasible to or.ranize an exploration fund. Within the existing structure of corporate and
securities law there is certainly room for courts to scrutinize
fairness of prices charged for properties and other services," '
to prevent the use by the sponsor of information developed
with respect to fund properties,2 0 8 and to preclude the sponsor
from dumping undesirable properties onto the fund.0 9 Such
scrutiny would, of course, require judicial statesmanship and
involve enlightened manipulation as well as application of
corporate opportunity, fraud, and fairness concepts. In addition, it would necessitate a further inquiry into the extent to
which purchase after disclosure is to be deemed the equivalent
of consent and ratification 0 Since the situations that could
arise are so varied and complex, it would be idle to speculate
206. A most attractive solution would regulate transactions between the sponsor
and the fund. See text accompanying note 151 supra. However, the proposed
amendments to extend the Investment Company Act to exploration funds
would be applicable only to a few funds and could be easily evaded by
changes in mode of operation. Id.
207. Fiduciary concepts relating to "secret profits" and corporate law doctrines
scrutinizing the fairness of transactions with insiders could be applied in
the exploration fund context. See H. HENN, CORPORATIONS 134-37, 374-77
(1961). The securities laws are also available to sustain a private action
in this general area. For example, an investor might allege fraud based on
the fund management's failure to disclose an intention to engage in selfdealing, with possible remedies under §§ 11, 12, and 17 of the Securities Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2), 77g (1964), and/or rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (1967), adopted under § 10 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1964).
Further, since the sponsor may be selling the fund a security, see text
accompanying notes 147-60 supra, it may be possible to allege-derivatively
on behalf of the fund or through a class action-fraud in the sale of the
security, utilizing the broad fraud provisions of rule lOb-5. Presumably, a
"derivative" action in the case of a partnership would take the form of an
actior for an -Accounting. Utilization of the federal securities laws as a
bas', for sucb actions would permit the plaintiff to avail himself of the
liberal venue nd extraterritorial service of process provisions of those laws.
Securitis F-'change Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964). Private actions
based upon fedpr,1 securities laws are in a state of rapid evolvement, with
ingenious applications being made at a rate that requires an up-to-theminute scrutiny of the cases and the literature. See generally H. BwOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW 401-82 (1966); A. BRom3mERo, SECURITIES LAW FRAUD
SEC Rule 10b-5 (1967).
208. See Minhaid v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
209. See Hooper v. Mountain States See. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. aievied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
210. Unanimous shareholders ratification will generally preclude a derivative
action in the case of a corporation, and less than unanimous ratification may
estop shareholders who ratify after appropriate disclosure. See H. HENN,
supra note 207, at 376, 574-75. A question remains, however, whether a
generally phrased advance disclosure of possible conflicts is the equivalent
of ratification and/or consent.
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concerning results in particular situations. However, in view
of the uncertainties in this area, counsel engaged in organizing
an exploration fund would be wise to attempt to minimize
potential conflicts along the lines that have been suggested,
and to the extent that conflicts cannot be avoided, they should
be fully disclosed in the prospectus of the fund.
MISCELLANY

Except when the corporate or partnership form is utilized, the exploration fund is based on legal doctrines developed primarily in other contexts and lacking a history of
application. Accordingly, there are few well defined legal
doctrines determining the rights and obligations of the parties
in the absence of, and perhaps despite, specific contractual
provisions. The lack of precedent necessitates extreme care
in drafting the instruments involved and the use of insurance
or other means of protecting the participants. The coownership joint operating agreement arrangements are particularly vulnerable on this score, with results frequently
depending upon whether a particular court will classify such
an arrangement as a "mining partnership." While such
classification generally depends upon the extent of the coowners' control over the operator, some courts, in particular
contexts, have gone far in finding the necessary control even
though, in fact, control appeared to be minimal.21 1
If a co-tenancy arrangement is characterized as a mining
partnership, the participants, despite the agreement among
themselves, will be liable to third parties for the partnership's
torts and for contractual obligations incurred on behalf of
the partnership. 12 Liability for fund contracts is likely to
arise when the operator-sponsor carries out operations not
specifically authorized by the co-owners, or in situations in
which the operator-sponsor has failed to pay all of the obligations incurred, despite receipt from the participants of
amounts committed by them. Although participants can be
211. See, e.g., Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, 2 Utah 2d 85, 269 P.2d 854
(1954), in which the court regarded a typical operating agreement as establishing the requisite control, despite the fact that the operators had the sole
right to explore and develop the land and to hire and control employees. See
generally Shepherd, Problems Incident to Joint Ownership of the Oil and
Gas Leasehold Estate, 5 OIL & GAS INST. 215 (1954).
212. Shell Oil Co. v. Prestidge, 249 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1957); Mud Control
Laboratories v. Covey, 2 Utah 2d 85, 269 P.2d 854 (1954).
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protected against possible tort liability by requiring the
operator-sponsor to take out sufficient insurance coverage,
the risk of contractual liability under the circumstances
outlined may be unavoidable if the operator-sponsor turns
out to be irresponsible. Limited protection would be afforded
by a provision that all contracts entered into by the operatorsponsor expressly recognize that the obligee is to look solely
to the operator-sponsor for payment. Participants, however,
are not ordinarily in a position to determine whether such
contractual provisions have been included.
There would appear to be no legal reason why participants in an exploration fund should be unable to assign their
interests, regardless of the form of organization used. A
limited partnership interest is, of course, assignable, although
the assignee can be substituted only if the certificate of limited
partnership so provides or all of the limited partners consent.2" In addition, co-tenancy interests can generally be
assigned, but subject to the provisions of any outstanding
operating agreement. 14 Nevertheless, all but one of the funds
examined restricted assignments in some manner. In four of
the funds, assignments could be made only with consent; in
two others, the sponsor-manager had a right of first refusal
to purchase the assigned interest; and in the remaining fund,
a partnership arrangement, the limited partnership interest
could be assigned, though the assignee could be substituted
as a limited partner only with the consent of the general
partner. While restrictions on assignment are desirable in
connection with a private placement to assure the availability
of the private offering exemption," similar restrictions are
not compelled by the Securities Act with respect to securities
registered thereunder. Restrictions on assignment can also
UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 19(5). Substitution also requires an
amendment to the certificate of limited partnership. Id. § 25.
214. The typical operating agreement provides that any assignee takes subject to
all the terms of the agreement. Although such a provision would presumably
have to be recorded in order to affect a purchaser for value without notice,
very often operating agreements are not recorded and, in fact, may not be
recordable instruments because they are not acknowledged. Absent an effective provision in this regard, the terms of the operating agreement may
nonetheless bind assignees as covenants running with the land. See 3 ROCKY

213.

MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 18.4(e)

(1967).
215. See note 169 supra and accompanying text. In order for the non-public
offering exemption to be available, the purchaser must not only have access
to information upon which to make an intelligent decision, but must also
acquire the interest for investment and not with a view to distribution. See
generallyi H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 207, at 146-61.
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be relevant in avoiding classification as an association, and
the consequent taxation as a corporation.216 But rather than
reflecting tax planning, the principal motivation for such
restrictions appears to be either to give the sponsor control
over the selection of participants or to give the sponsor the
benefit of a right of first refusal.
Those funds which contemplate any continuing obligation of participants to commit monies or of the sponsor to
invest such monies generally provide for some form of termination of the fund program in the event further investment
would prove futile. Nonetheless, there is rarely any provision made for termination of the continuing relationship
that will result if oil and gas are produced.2 " Since the
sponsor is ordinarily the operator under the operating agreement, it presumably will continue to manage the properties
and operations as long as they are productive. Yet, provisions
are seldom made for selecting successors to the operator and,
if the operator should prove irresponsible, the participants
do not have well defined legal remedies. There is some
authority, however, which would permit a court to remove
the operator and appoint a receiver under certain circumstances.21 It is possible that partition might also be an
effective remedy, but, if utilized, would probably result in a
forced sale of the fund property.21 Thus, for most purposes
the investor-participants in exploration funds have to view
themselves as effectively precluded from participation in
management and unable to remove management. Accordingly,
careful consideration should be given by investors to management's experience, reputation, and continued availability.
Since there are no well established standards of care
required of the manager-sponsor in his performance under
an operating agreement or otherwise, most of the funds
216.
217.

See note 81 supra.
Funds commonly provide that the operating agreement shall continue in
force as long as any oil and gas lease subject to the agreement is still in
effect.
218. Stephens v. Allen, 314 Ky. 769, 773, 237 S.W.2d 72, 74-75 (1951) (dictum).
219. See, e.g., Harper v. Ford, 317 P.2d 210 (Okla. 1957). The right to partition
may depend, however, both on how a particular jurisdiction classified
mineral interests in property terms and on the provisions of specific statutes
relating to partition. See generally Murphy, A Critique of Partition of
Mineral Estate in the United States, 5 ROCKY MT. MINERAL LAW INST. 543
(1960). The operating agreement employed by one of the funds examined
specifically provided that the interest holders were deemed to have waived
any right they may have had to seek partition.
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examined attempted to provide a contractual standard for
this purpose. One fund, for example, provided that the
manager should be held to the standard of care to be exercised by independent oil and gas operators, which would
appear to be a normal negligence standard.2 2 ' Two funds
specifically provided that the manager would be liable only
for acts of gross negligence, fraud, or willful misconduct.
Three others deemed that the manager should not be liable
for any good faith act or omission on its part provided it
exercised its best judgment. 2 1 Moreover, two of these three
funds provided that the manager would be indemnified for
any tort or contract liability it incurred in managing the
fund provided it had acted in accordance with the foregoing
standard.
The co-ownership arrangements lend themselves to
assurances that investors will receive current distributions
from production. If production is obtained and each co-owner
is named in the division order executed with the purchaser
of the oil, remittances will be made directly to the co-owner
by the purchaser. The operator typically bills such co-owners
for their proportionate share of operating costs. In fact, an
arrangement of this type is often necessary in order to avoid
having the IRS classify the interest as a net profit interest. 2
Limited partnerships also should have few problems in dis220. In the context in which exploration funds are organized and promoted, it
would appear that the sponsors should be held to the standard of care
applied generally to one who holds himself out as having special skill and
knowledge. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 164 (3d ed. 1964). Much of partnership
law relating to intra-partner liability has been developed in the context of
small partnerships in which all partners participate in management and
none possess special skill. Thus, it is not unusual to find statements such
as the following: "A partner is not held to possess the degree of knowledge
and skill of a paid agent .... He is not liable to his partnership for the
whole burden of losses caused by errors of judgment and failure to use
ordinary skill and care in the supervision and transaction of business." J.
CRANE, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 368 (2d ed. 1952).
Compare the following
statement made with respect to the managing partner of what the court
characterized as a mining partnership: "[T]here is a consequent duty of
acting in good faith and with honesty and diligence." Stephens v. Allen, 314
Ky. 769, 773, 237 S.W.2d 72, 75 (1951).
221. It appears that these funds were attempting to establish the lesser standard
referred to in note 220 supra with regard to the exercise of due care, and
something akin to the "business judgment rule" as to the exercise of judgment. For a discussion of the business judgment rule see H. HENN, supra
note 207, at 364-65.
222. The IRS characterizes an arrangement under which the operator advances
all costs and then recover these out of production as an unlimited carry,
and equivalent to a net profit interest. See United States v. Thomas, 329
F.2d 119, 130 (9th Cir. 1964); G.C.M. 22,730, 1941-1 CUM. BULL. 214. For
the tax consequences of a net profit interest see text accompanying notes
99-141 supra.
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tributing cash generated from production to the partners.
Care must be taken, however, in the distribution of cash
representing a withdrawal of capital, since such a withdrawal
by a limited partner without compliance with certain procedures will subject him to unlimited liability."' Of the funds
examined five appeared to contemplate immediate distributions to the extent that monies were available from production. The other two funds precluded distributions for ten
years, and the cash generated was to be reinvested in the
organization of new limited partnerships. Although investors
in these funds were permitted to withdraw after a minimum
period, the "redemption" price substantially discounted the
value of their interests.
CONCLUSION

While some exploration fund practices are not completely
satisfactory from either a legal or financial viewpoint, such
funds play a worthwhile economic role in channeling capital
into the development of natural resources. In this article an
attempt has been made to chart a course through the somewhat murky legal waters in which exploration funds are
organized and operated. In view of the many areas of the
law upon which exploration funds touch, the task of putting
together such a fund should be a challenging one.

223. See, e.g., UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 16; WYo. STAT. ANN. §§
17-251, 17-253 (1957). Under § 16 of the ULPA, a capital withdrawal or
reduction can be made only if: (1) all liabilities have been paid or there
remains property of the partnership sufficient to pay them, (2) the consent
of all members is had, and (3) the certificate is cancelled or so amended
to set forth the capital withdrawal or reduction. To the extent that depletion
reserves are distributed, they may represent a prohibited withdrawal of
capital, and the appropriate statutory procedures should be followed. A few
archaic statutes, such as the Wyoming statute cited above, do not include
any procedures for withdrawal of capital. Where this type of statute is in
force, consideration should be given to organizing the limited partnersihp
under the laws of a state which has adopted the ULPA. However, while
there is some authority to the effect that the liability of a limited partner
will be determined by the law of the state of organization, e.g., Gilman Paint
& Varnish Co. v. Legum, 197 Md. 665, 669, 80 A.2d 906, 908 (1951), authority
in this area is sparse, and certainly the state in which operations are being
carried on, if the forum state, would have a sufficient interest to justify
applying its own law. See generally A. EHRENZWEIC, CONFLICT OF LAWS
424-25 (1962). Although limited partnership acts generally make no provision for qualifying foreign partnerships, presumably it would be advisable
to file and put on record, at the appropriate offices in the state in which
operations are being conducted, a copy of the certificate of limited
partnership.
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